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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate contemporary issues concerning population 
aging and low fertility in Korea’s economy. 
The first chapter examines the impact of intra-household transfers on the labor supply of 
elderly parents by employing “child’s gender” as an exogenous variable which leads to parents’ 
differential lifetime net transfers to children. Parental resource allocation in Korea tends to be 
greater for sons. However, older parents receive less financial support from grown-up sons than 
traditionally expected. This might be due to an erosion of the long-standing implicit contract 
between sons and their parents in Korea. Based on evidence that lifetime net transfers from 
parents are larger to sons than to daughters, I hypothesize that parents who have sons rather than 
daughters increase their labor supply to offset this cost. In empirical estimates using the Korean 
Longitudinal Study of Aging data sets, the results show that parents with sons tend to retire later 
or increase working hours compared to parents with daughters. This “son effect” is especially 
profound in cases where the boy is also the first-born child. 
The second chapter investigates the effect of a major change, in 2011, in the South 
Korean childcare leave benefits scheme, on fertility. I use a difference-in-differences analysis, 
exploiting the fact that the reform which increased the generosity of childcare leave benefits was 
targeted at higher-wage earners. I use the monthly wages and employment status as measures to 
define a treatment group and a control group. Education level is also used as a proxy for monthly 
wages in alternative estimation strategies in determining the labor supply effect. I find that the 
2011 reform had positive impacts on conception for the treatment group (higher-wage or higher-
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education workers) compared to the control group (lower-wage or lower-education workers). 
These impacts were substantial in cases of second or higher-order fertility. Consistently, I find 
that the reform had negative effects on the contraceptive use of the treatment group. The results 
also show evidence of declining career interruption for the treatment group in post-reform. This 
effect seems a result of another specific aim of the reform: lowering career interruptions of 
women after giving birth. 
The third chapter examines the effect of health shocks on the affected persons’ and their 
spouse’s labor supply using the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging. Health shocks can cause 
substantial loss of household income due to an involuntary exit from the labor force as well as 
through direct medical expenditures. In response to this loss of income, a spouse may increase 
his or her labor supply to make up for lost income. On the other hand, a spouse may decrease his 
or her labor supply if health shock strongly requires care-giving for the affected individual. The 
analysis reveals that health shocks reduce the labor supply for both affected males and females. 
The results also show that husband’s chronic illness increase wife’s labor supply. However, a 
wife’s health shocks do not affect a husband’s labor supply. The little impact of women’s health 
shocks may be explained by the fact that women’s earnings are usually a secondary source of 
household income in dual-earner couples, so male workers may not be highly sensitive to the 
economic impact of their partners' health shocks. The results also indicate that having low net 
assets decreases the probability of exiting the labor force for husbands and increases the 
probability of entering the labor force for wives in response to spousal health shocks. These 
imply that a lack of sufficient wealth in a household enhances the “Added Worker Effect” in 
South Korea. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF INTRA-HOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS ON 
RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The substantial explicit and implicit costs of raising children often have a sizable effect on the 
behavior of parents, in terms of such things as the intra-household allocation of time and 
resources. Although a large volume of literature examines investment of time and resources by 
parents in their children’s development, these studies tend to focus on the behavior of relatively 
young parents, as the bulk of transfers from parents to children occur when children are young. 
Nevertheless, children are often also an important source of old-age security for parents, which 
can in part be considered a grown child’s eventual repayment for investment in their education 
and upbringing (Lillard and Willis, 1997). While there are alternative forms of old-age security 
such as private savings and the public social security system, many elderly parents still rely on 
familial transfers from grown-up children for security in old-age. This is especially true in Asia 
where familial transfers from grown-up children to elderly parents are much more prevalent than 
in other economies (Lee, Mason, and Park, 2011). 
These economic linkages between parents and children are more pronounced between 
parents and sons than between parents and daughters in Asian countries such as South Korea 
(henceforth Korea), China, and Taiwan. In these countries, parents allocate more financial 
resources and time to sons, especially to the eldest son, than to daughters, for reasons having to 
2 
 
do with the socio-economic system, “son preference”, or social norms such as implicit exchange 
motives (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005; Booth and Kee, 
2009; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Wong, 2013; Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney, 
2014; Bu, 2014). Reciprocally, grown-up sons tend to transfer more resources to their elderly 
parents than grown-up daughters do in these societies (Yang, 1996; Sun, 2002; Lin et al., 2003; 
Kim, 2010). 
Korea presents a unique and noteworthy case with regard to this subject. First and 
foremost, in Korea, financial transfers from parents to children are often prolonged as parents 
remain continuously involved in their children’s affairs—including education, career, marriage, 
and even housing—long after the children reach adulthood. Parents often make long-term 
financial and time commitments with the underlying expectation of future old-age security 
provided by their eldest son or other sons. This contrasts starkly with other developed countries. 
Second, Korea’s elderly population has the second-highest labor force participation rate among 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries. The 
labor force participation rate of people 65 years-old or older was 31.3 percent in 2015, while the 
average for OECD countries was 14.1 percent (OECD, 2017a). Third, in spite of high labor force 
participation of the elderly, many elderly people earn only small incomes. The poverty rate for 
those aged 65 or older is also the highest among the OECD member countries, reaching 48.8% 
percent in 2014 (OECD, 2017b). This might be caused mainly by the National Pension Scheme 
(NPS) providing no or little entitlement to those who retired before the mid-2000s due to its 
belated establishment in 1988
1
. Moreover, this particular age group tends to have insufficient 
                                                 
1
 The first disbursement of normal benefit by the NPS was in 2008 and individuals who retired before 2008 received 
no or substantially reduced pension benefits. 
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private savings or assets to allow for a comfortable retirement due to significant expenditure on 
their children’s education2 or housing. Fourth, many parents allocate household resources 
according to a child’s gender. Traditionally, Korean parents had a strong son preference, and 
tended to allocate more resources for sons than for daughters in terms of child-rearing and 
bequests, (and which may in part have stemmed from an exchange motive with respect to inter-
generational transfers). Lastly, in Korea, men still tend to earn more than women and so are often 
better able to provide financial support to their parents in return. Also, as a result of the influence 
of Confucianism, it seems natural that sons be responsible for supporting elderly parents. This 
relationship might be viewed as an implicit contract between parents and sons. Recently, 
however, this parents-sons relationship has been diminishing due to rapid declines of traditional 
familial support systems and substantial improvements in women’s socio-economic status. 
This study examines the linkage between intra-household transfers and the labor supply 
of elderly parents by utilizing the 2006-2014 waves of the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging 
(KLoSA). Child’s gender is utilized as an exogenous variable leading to the difference in the 
parental lifetime net transfers. Based on evidence that parental lifetime net transfers to sons are 
larger compared to that apportioned for daughters, this study tests if parents with sons tend to 
work more in order to make up the income spent. The results show that parents with sons tend to 
retire later or increase their working hours more than parents with daughters. The results are 
robust to various specifications, indicating that parents tend to work more when they have sons 
than when they have daughters. These results suggest that the long-standing implicit contract 
between sons and their parents is eroding in Korea. Older parents receive less financial support 
                                                 
2
 The education expenditure for children accounts for 14.6 percent of the total household consumption expenditure 
in 2014 in Korea (Park, 2015). 
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from grown-up sons than expected although they allocate larger resources to sons. This erosion 
of the implicit contract may be one reason for an ongoing transition in which son preference is 
becoming less prevalent. This study contributes to showing the link between intra-household and 
retirement behavior in the elderly–─something that has been paid little attention to in the 
literature──by using a relatively reliable exogenous variation.  
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the previous 
literature on familial transfers correlated with child’s gender. Section 1.3 describes the 
conceptual framework and the Korean context. Section 1.4 presents the data and empirical 
methods. Section 1.5 provides the main results and an extension of the analysis. Lastly, the final 
section concludes with the implications of the study. 
 
1.2  Literature Reviews 
A copious amount of literature has attempted to explain the motivation for intergenerational 
transfers within families. The altruism model argues that intergenerational transfers are induced 
by altruistic preferences among family members and a larger amount of parental transfers are 
made to children with fewer lifetime resources (Becker, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1976). 
Conversely, the exchange model suggests that intra-family transfers are motivated by the 
expectation of compensation from the recipient and thus parents tend to make more transfers to 
children with higher incomes (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985: Cox, 1987; Bernheim, 
1991). Lillard and Willis (1997) also suggest the old-age security hypothesis and the parental 
repayment hypothesis. According to the old-age security hypothesis, parents depend on 
children’s transfers as a means of saving or as assets for old-age security, especially in 
5 
 
developing countries where financial institutions are limited or government social security 
systems are underdeveloped. Focusing on borrowing rather than savings constraints, the parental 
repayment hypothesis argues that an implicit contract between parents and children is the 
underlying reason for parents’ investing in the human capital of children and that children repay 
the investment by providing old-age security for their parents. 
Looking at this more closely researchers have empirically examined the influence of the 
child’s gender on parental transfers in developing countries, focusing mainly on parental 
investment in their children's health and education. In Asian developing countries, the 
differential allocation of household resources by child’s gender is closely associated with son 
preference (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Qian, 2008; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Wong, 
2013; Barcellos et al., 2014). Strauss and Thomas (1995) find that girls in South Asia receive 
fewer nutritional and health inputs and are disadvantaged in terms of access to education. 
Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) and Barcellos et al. (2014) document the preponderance of 
boys receiving more childcare time, vitamin supplementation, and breastfeeding compared to 
girls in India. In the case of China, Qian (2008) finds that an increase in relative female income 
in a household increases the survival rates for girls, whereas an increase in relative male income 
decreases the survival rates and educational attainment for girls. On the other hand, Wong (2013) 
examines whether the allocation of family resources is dependent on the child’s gender in the 
United States and Korea by using the Health and Retirement Study for the US and the KLoSA 
for Korea. The results indicate that sons receive larger inter-vivos transfers and attain higher 
levels of education than daughters in Korea, while it's the opposite in the US.  
In the US, extensive studies on the role of the child’s gender in child-to-parents familial 
transfers report that American daughters are more likely than sons to provide assistance to their 
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aging parents (Coward and Dwyer, 1990; Dwyer and Coward, 1991; Stoller, 1990; Shuey and 
Hardy, 2003). This tendency is reversed in Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, and Korea 
where sons tend to provide more financial support to their parents (Yang, 1996; Sun, 2002; Lin 
et al., 2003; Kim, 2010). One study by Xie and Zhu (2009) stands in contrast to the norm in Asia, 
and shows that in urban China, married daughters provide more financial support to elderly 
parents than married sons do. They interpret the results as a reflection of the rapid disappearance 
of the traditional Chinese family model in which sons usually bear more responsibility for 
supporting elderly parents. 
 
1.3  Backgrounds 
 1.3.1  Conceptual Framework  
To conceptualize the linkage between gender of offspring and parental labor supply, this study 
considers parents' lifetime budget constraints which are directly related to child’s gender as 
follows: 
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )C P P Cw L g X T g X C X T g X     ,                (1.1) 
where w is the wage rate, ( )L  is parent’s labor supply, ( )
C PT    is the financial transfers from 
children to a parent, ( )C  is parent’s consumption, ( )
P CT    is the financial transfers from a 
parent to children, g is child’s gender (one if son; zero if daughter) and X  is the set of parent’s 
characteristics. I assume that there is no public sector, no asset income, and no financial transfer 
to others. The equation (1.1) is rewritten as follows:  
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 ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )P C C Pw L g X C X T g X T g X     ,                (1.2) 
or 
 ( , ) ( ) ( , )P Cw L g X C X NetT g X   ,                    (1.3) 
where ( )P CNetT    are the net transfers from a parent to children. With the assumption that 
wage rate is constant (=1), the equation (1.4) can be drawn from the equation (1.3) as follows: 
 (1, ) (0, ) (1, ) (0, )P C P CL X L X NetT X NetT X    ,            (1.4) 
In the equation (1.4), “if (1, ) (0, ) 0P C P CNetT X NetT X   , then (1, ) (0, ) 0L X L X  ” is 
obtained. In other words, if the parents' lifetime net transfers to children are larger when parents 
have sons rather than daughters, then the labor supply of that parent increases. An increase in 
labor supply might be represented by delayed retirement or more working hours. A worker may 
choose to delay retirement to increase labor supply if their working hours are not flexible. 
Conversely, if a worker can adjust their working hours, then he or she may choose to increase 
working hours instead of delaying retirement. Thus, this study considers these two possibilities 
in examining the labor supply response.   
On the other hand, accurately estimating differences between parents’ lifetime net 
transfers to sons and daughters (i.e. (1, ) (0, )P C P CNetT X NetT X  ) is problematic. To do this 
would really require comprehensive data sets which contain all lifetime transactions between a 
parent and child. As such comprehensive data sets are difficult—or impossible—to obtain, I look 
at various surveys, statistics or related studies that enable us to reasonably determine the sign of 
the “ (1, ) (0, )
P C P CNetT X NetT X  ” in the following subsections. 
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 1.3.2  Differences between Parental Transfers to Sons and Daughters in Korea 
Until recently, son preference persisted in Korea. The sex ratio at birth initially widened 
following the introduction of ultrasound technology in the 1980s. It reached a peak of 116 boys 
to 100 girls in 1990. However, the development of the Korean economy and the improvement of 
women’s socio-economic status led to its level to a natural level of 105 boys to 100 girls in 2014. 
As for the motive for son preference, researchers often emphasize the influence of social 
institutions and cultural norms such as the son’s traditional role in caring for elderly parents, 
patriarchy, and male-preference primogeniture (Das Gupta et al., 2003; Chung and Gupta, 2007). 
Many studies find differential allocations of household resources in health or education 
investment between sons and daughters in countries where son preference is observed (Strauss 
and Thomas, 1995; Qian, 2008; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Wong, 2013; Barcellos et 
al., 2014). The differential parental investment between sons and daughters influenced by son 
preference might be explained by the exchange model in inter-generational transfers. The higher 
market status of men in developing countries makes sons more appealing to parents as a potential 
source of old-age support. 
Under the influence of son preference or the implicit contract between parents and sons, 
there may be various boy-girl differences in parental net transfers to their children in Korea. 
Among them, this study focuses on three areas considered especially significant: (1) investment 
in children’s education; (2) support for children’s marriage expenses; (3) income transfers from 
grown-up children to elderly parents. This study analyzes the behavior of parents born mainly in 
the 1940s to 1950s and their children born mainly in the 1970s to 1980s. Based on this time 
frame, I reasonably assume that these children enrolled in secondary and tertiary school in the 
1980s to 1990s, married in the mid-1990s to mid-2010s, and begun income transfers to elderly 
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parents in the 2000s to 2010s. By analyzing the behavior of these age groups, this study 
highlights the differences in parental net transfers to sons and daughters. 
  Parental Investment in Children’s Education 
Korean parents are generally very devoted and willing to allocate an enormous amount of their 
income toward their children’s education. Hence, the cost of education for their children is often 
parents’ main economic burden in raising children. Once children are enrolled in school, parents 
often spend a considerable amount of money for tuition, textbooks, private tutoring
3
, and even 
lodging. Thus, it is possible to deduce the role of a child’s gender in education investment made 
by parents by looking at the difference in school enrollment rates along gender lines. Panel A of 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the secondary school enrollment rate in the 1980s to 1990s. It shows that 
Figure 1.1. School Enrollment Rates in Korea  
Panel A. Secondary School Panel B. Tertiary School 
  
Source: World Development Indicators           
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/). 
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Republic of 
Korea and Korean Educational Development 
Institute, Statistical Yearbook of Education 
(http://kess.kedi.re.kr/index). 
 
                                                 
3
 In Korea, the expenditure on private tutoring is an important form of parental investment in children’s education 
(Lee and Lee, 2015). 
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secondary school enrollment rate for boys was higher than girls in the 1980s
4
. In the 1990s, the 
tertiary school enrollment rate for men was higher than women while the secondary school 
enrollment rate was similar between them. Based on these statistics, it is evident that the 
educational investment in sons was, on average, higher compared to daughters in the given 
period of analysis. 
  Support for Children’s Marriage Expenses 
Several studies have investigated gender differential in marriage expenses and financial 
obligation borne by family, especially in the Chinese context. They show that a groom’s family 
often pays a “bride price” that exceeds the value of a dowry (Brown, Bulte, and Zhang, 2011; 
Wei and Zhang, 2011; Zhang, 2000). Wei and Zhang (2011) find that groom’s families need to 
save money over a longer period time than the families of brides—often for a few years before 
and after the wedding—and tend to pay for the majority of wedding costs. They also show that a 
groom’s family is mainly responsible for procuring a house for the newlyweds, which is 
becoming a significant burden for a groom’s parents (Wei and Zhang, 2011; Zhang, 2000). A 
similar marriage tradition is also observable in Korea. Korean marriages require a huge amount 
of money, typically for housing, fixtures, wedding ceremony, honeymoon, and gift exchanges. 
The heaviest monetary burden is often the cost of a house for the newlyweds. Though a large 
number of newly married couples rent a house instead of buying one, the cost of housing is still a 
burden due to Korea’s unique rental system called “Jeonse5” which requires a big lump-sum   
                                                 
4
 Secondary school was not mandatory during this time since compulsory education in secondary school was 
introduced fully in 2004 in Korea. 
5
 Jeonse requires tenants to make a deposit of approximately two-thirds of the property price for key money, which 
is then refunded once the lease expires. The tenant pays no monthly rent for the duration of the contract, which 
typically lasts for two years. Jeonse was traditionally much more popular than a monthly payment system until 
recently. 
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deposit to start. In Korean society, the burden of marriage expenses is usually heavier for men 
than for women since men are traditionally responsible for procuring a house upon marriage. 
Newlyweds tend to depend on their parents to finance wedding expenditures, and many parents 
also tend to regard these expenses as a duty. As a result, the parents of a groom bear a heavier 
burden of support for marriage expenses than the bride’s parents.  
Several surveys and studies make note of the monetary burden arising from these 
marriage traditions. As can be seen in Table 1.1, Kim et al. (1994) reports that the average cost 
of housing at marriage was $38,600 (in 1993 USD); the groom’s parents accounted for 47.4 
percent of the housing cost on average, while 10.4 percent was financed by the bride’s parents. A 
2012 survey conducted on marriages from 2010 to 2012 by the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
and the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) illustrates the cost of marriage 
in recent years (Table 1.2). The groom’s side spent an average of $112,000 (in 2012 USD) for 
marriage, and around 40 percent of the total marriage cost was financed by others (i.e. his 
parents). As for the bride’s side, the cost of marriage was $33,700 (in 2012 USD) with almost 
half of the cost defrayed by others. In the same survey, 75 percent of male respondents replied 
that housing cost was the heaviest burden of marriage. Lee (2011) shows that a groom’s financial 
share in marriage expenditure is approximately 80 to 90 percent for all age groups, suggesting 
that the Korean tradition of the groom’s family footing the majority of housing costs for 
newlyweds is still prevalent (Table 1.3). These surveys and studies confirm that parents’ 
financial support for their children’s marriages is much higher for sons than for daughters 
primarily due to the understanding that parents of a groom are responsible for housing costs for 
their newlywed children. 
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Table 1.1. Housing Expense at Marriage in 1993 
Housing expense From groom’s parents From bride’s parents 
$38,600 47.4% 10.4% 
Note: price in 1993, Korean won is converted into dollar terms using OECD PPP exchange rates (645.2 
Korean won=1 dollar, 1993). 
Source: Kim et al. (1994). 
 
Table 1.2. Marriage Expenses in 2012: Including Housing Expenses 
 Marriage expenses From parents 
Groom $112,000 42.7% 
Bride $33,700 47.2% 
Note: price in 2012, Korean won is converted into dollar terms using OECD PPP exchange rates (854.9 
Korean won=1 dollar, 2012). 
Source: National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Dynamics (Kim et al., 2012).   
 
Table 1.3. Shares in Housing Expenses at Marriage 
Age group 20’s-30’s 40’s-50’s 60’s 
Groom 86.5% 78.3% 93.8% 
Bride 13.5% 21.7% 6.2% 
Source: Lee (2011). 
 
  Financial Transfers from Children to Elderly Parents 
In Confucian-influenced countries such as Korea, inter-generational transfers in a household 
occur not only in a downward direction but also in an upward direction as grown-up children 
support their retired parents. Among grown-up children, sons (especially the eldest) have 
traditionally taken greater responsibility than daughters in supporting parents. Given this 
traditional sons-parents economic relationship, elderly parents with sons are usually supported 
better financially.  
13 
 
Few relevant studies on this reciprocal and gender-dependent inter-generational transfer 
are available. Kim (2010) may be the only Korean study that examines how the gender of 
offspring affects financial transfers from grown-up children to aging parents
6
. Using data from 
the KLoSA, the author finds that grown-up sons provide more net financial support to their 
elderly parents than daughters by $260 (in 2005 USD) per year in 2005. However, the value of 
this annual difference is small compared to the overall impact of child’s gender on 
disproportionate parental support for education and marriage.  
A possible explanation for the relatively minor difference between sons and daughters in 
direct financial support for elderly parents is the fading of Confucian traditions in the lives of the 
younger generation. Many grown-up children do not seem to feel that sons should be the main 
providers of old-age security for their parents. However, elderly parents still tend to expect more 
support from sons than daughters after retirement. The results of surveys conducted by the 
Korean government further support these ideas well. The survey asks, “Who should mainly be 
responsible for supporting elderly parents?” Figure 1.2 illustrates the percentage of people who 
believe that the eldest son should care for elderly parents in 1998 and 2002, respectively. The 
survey results show that only a small percentage of the younger generation thinks that the eldest 
son should support his elderly parents and this number is shrinking over time, whereas a 
substantial percentage of the older generation still think that the eldest son should provide old-
age security. A 1990 revision of the civil law on inheritance may also be weakening sons’ 
motivation to support their elderly parents. Before the revision of the law, the eldest son 
inherited most of his parents’ wealth, and younger sons still inherited more than daughters. 
                                                 
6
 In this study, children are defined as adults aged 19 or over who do not live with their parents and are not students 
during the time of the survey. The average age of parents is 69.5 and that of their children is 41.5. 
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However, since the revision, all children have been entitled to equal inheritance regardless of 
their gender or birth order. Additionally, the improvement of the socio-economic status of 
women could be important. Several studies argue that an increase in women’s earnings enhances 
women’s relative bargaining power in intra-household resource allocation (Manser and Brown, 
1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1990; Chau et al., 
2007). The enhanced bargaining power of women may increase daughters’ financial transfers to 
their own elderly parents instead of their parents-in-law, according to their preference. 
 
1.3.3  Hypothesis  
The evidence presented above suggests that parental lifetime net transfers to children are, on 
average, greater when parents have sons rather than daughters. The discrepancy largely results 
from the fact that parents transfer more income to sons for education and marriage, than to 
daughters, while the gender difference in income transfers from children to parents for old-age 
security is negligible. Due to an erosion of the implicit contract traditionally maintained between 
Figure 1.2. Percentages of People    
Who Believe the Eldest Son 
Should Care for Elderly Parents 
 
Note: The figure displays the percentage of people by age, who responded, “the eldest son,” to the 
question, “Who should mainly be responsible for supporting elderly parents?”   
Source: Statistics Korea, Republic of Korea, Social Survey (http://kosis.kr/).                                      
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parents and sons, elderly parents come to receive less financial support than might originally 
have been expected from their grown-up sons. Based on these findings, this study hypothesizes 
that parents with sons rather than daughters increase their labor supply to offset their spending. 
The following sections test this hypothesis using several estimation methods. 
 
1.4  Data and Estimation Methods 
 1.4.1  Data 
To test the effect of the child’s gender on the labor supply of parents, I primarily use the fifth 
wave of the KLoSA, which was conducted in 2014. The first to fourth waves of the KLoSA are 
also used as supplements in order to collect job history data, such as the employment status of 
the recent job and the year of retirement. The KLoSA is a biennial survey that began in 2006 for 
creating the basic data needed to devise and implement effective social and economic policies to 
manage an aging population. It interviewed 10,254 individuals (aged 45 or older) in 2006 and 
contains a relatively large sample size of older workers in Korea. Topics covered include 
demography, family, health, employment, income, assets, and subjective expectations and 
satisfactions. The fifth wave had 7,029 respondents (2,987 males and 4,042 females) as some 
respondents had been dropped since the first wave or did not respond. I restrict the samples to 
retirees or workers as of the interview date in 2014, excluding those who have never had a job 
before, or those who have the intention to work, but do not work currently. In this study, I adopt 
the definition of retirement employed by the KLoSA, which is (1) having stopped doing income-
earning activities, (2) presently not working or engaging only in pastime work, and (3) having no 
intention of engaging in anything more serious than pastime work as long as there is no special 
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change in circumstances. The final sample consists of 4,375 individuals (2,596 males and 1,779 
females).  
Identifying the birth years of parents and children is essential in examining the impact of 
the gender of offspring on the parents’ labor supply because the trend of gender difference in 
offspring affecting parents’ lifetime net transfers to children may change over time. As shown in 
Table 1.4, the mean birth year for parents is 1947 (S.D. 9.28) for the males and 1949 (S.D. 9.01) 
for the females, and the mean birth year of the children is 1978 (S.D. 9.37) for the males and 
1977 (S.D. 9.26) for the females. 
Table 1.4. Year of Birth in the Samples 
  Male Female 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Year of Birth (Respondent) 1947 9.28 1949 9.01 
Children’s Year of Birth 1978 9.37 1977 9.26 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
 
Table 1.5 reports the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the analysis. In 
the selected samples, 41 percent of male workers with the mean age of 67 were retired in 2014 
and 38 percent of female workers with the mean age of 65 were retired in 2014. The mean 
retirement year is 2003 for both male and female retirees. They have 2.8 children on average for 
male respondents, and 2.9 for female respondents and the ratio of sons to children in a household 
is slightly more than half. The average age of the youngest child is 35 for the male samples (36 
for the female samples), and 69.2% of the total children were married in 2014. Both education 
level and public pension enrollment rate of the males are higher compared with the females. It 
reflects the higher socio-economic position of males in Korean older generation. 
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Table 1.5. Summary Statistics 
  Male Female 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Work status (0=working, 1= retired)  0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 
Weekly working hours (if working) 44.03 15.60 39.76 17.53 
Retirement year (if retired)  2003 9.19 2003 10.25 
Age 67.48 9.28 65.22 9.01 
Ratio of sons to children 0.52 0.29 0.52 0.29 
Number of children 2.82 1.25 2.95 1.37 
Age of the youngest child 35.14 8.67 36.42 8.49 
Education (1=high school or more) 0.56 0.50 0.30 0.46 
Health status (1=bad) 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 
Employment status (1=self-employed)
a
 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Place of residence (1=rural) 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 
Household net assets (USD)
b
 316,885 391,724 258,666 346,414 
Observations 2,596  1,779  
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a
 For retirees, it is measured by the employment status of most recent job.
  
b
 Korean won is converted into dollar terms using OECD PPP exchange rates (870 Korean won=1 
dollar, 2014). 
 
 1.4.2  Estimation Methods 
In order to test the hypothesis that parents with sons increase their labor supply compared to 
parents with daughters, the following equation is basically estimated:  
   0 1i i X i iy chgender X       ,                    (1.5) 
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where iy is the labor supply of individual i, ichgender  is the gender of i’s child, iX  is a set of 
i’s characteristics likely to affect his/her labor supply.  
To examine the effect of the child’s gender on labor supply comprehensively, three types 
of dependent variables are constructed in this study: (1) binary variable for retirement (zero if 
working; one if retired); (2) respondent’s age at retirement; (3) weekly working hours (censored 
at 0). Method (1) and (3) enable us to estimate the impact of the child’s gender on retirees and 
workers, while method (2) captures the impact on retirees only. As for the independent variable, 
measuring “child’s gender” can be an issue when a respondent has both sons and daughters. This 
study measures “child’s gender” in the following three ways: (1) the ratio of sons to total number 
of children, controlling for the total number of children; (2) the variables for both the number of 
sons and the number of daughters which are included in the estimation models simultaneously; 
(3) the dummies for the gender of each child, controlling for the total number of children. 
On the other hand, sibling sex-composition in a household cannot always be treated as an 
exogenous variable due to the technology of sex-selective abortion. Several studies find that 
having access to such technology significantly increases the number of sex-selective abortion 
incidents (Kim, 2005; Chen, Li, and Meng, 2013). However, this is not likely to be a problem for 
the purposes of this study as it mainly focuses on children who were born before the diffusion of 
ultrasound technology
7
. Additionally, the gender of the first-born child may affect parents’ 
decision-making in whether or not to have an additional child if parents have a strong preference 
for a certain kind of child’s gender (Gupta, 1987; Raju and Bhat, 1995; Arnold, 1997). This may 
                                                 
7
 In Korea, sex selection technologies such as ultrasonic tests were introduced in the early 1980s and were widely 
diffused by the late 1980s (Lee and Lee, 2015). 
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not also be problematic in this study because parents’ preference for child’s gender is not likely 
to be much systematically correlated with their retirement behavior later in their life-cycle. 
 
1.5  Results 
 1.5.1  Impact on the Probability of Retirement 
As the first estimation method, this study uses probit models to capture the effect of the child’s 
gender on parents’ retirement behavior. The probit models are derived from a latent variable 
model as shown in equation (1.6). Assume that *
ir  is the unobserved propensity to retire given 
by the probit index function for individual i by: 
*
0 1i i X ir chgender X     ,                           (1.6) 
where 
ichgender  is the child’s gender of i, and iX  is a set of individual’s characteristics. 
The binary outcome variable for whether the worker retires is:  
*
*
1 0
0 0
i
i
i
if r
R
if r
 
 

 
  
,                               (1.7) 
Table 1.6 presents the probit estimates of equation (1.6) and (1.7) using the ratio of sons 
to the number of total children as the key independent variable. The first specification includes 
only the number of total children and parent’s age as the other explanatory variables, while the 
second specification additionally includes dummies for education, marital status, employment 
status, spouse’s work status, health status, and residence, the age of the youngest child, and 
logged household net assets.  
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Column (1) and (2) of Table 1.6 show the probit estimates of the first specification of 
males and females. The results indicate that the probability of retirement is reduced by 11.5 
percentage points for males and 8.5 percentage points for females when all children are sons 
rather than daughters. When other individual’s characteristics are used to control any bias 
associated with individual preferences for leisure in Column (3) and (4), the “son effect” is still 
present although the magnitude and significance are slightly reduced for both males and females. 
The coefficient of the ratio of sons in Column (3) indicates that when the gender of all children is 
male, it leads to a 9.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of retirement in male parents; 
this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Given that the average probability of men’s 
retirement of 40.9 percent from Table 1.5, this suggests an increase in the retirement rate by 24.0 
percent. Column (4) reports the probit results for females. If all children are sons, it reduces the 
probability of retirement of the females by 7.1 percentage points (p-value = 0.094). This effect is 
also not small relative to the average probability of female retirement at 38.3 percent. 
  As shown in Column (3) and (4) of Table 1.6, when other explanatory variables such as 
education, health status, and employment status are added, the effect of the number of children 
falls substantially for both males and females. Especially, the employment status (1=self-
employed) and the place of residence (1=rural area) are attributable to this decrease because 
these two variables are positively correlated with the number of children. It suggests that people 
who live in rural areas and are self-employed tend to have more children. The number of 
children is also negatively correlated with the ratio of sons (correlation coefficient: -0.229). The 
relationships between these variables suggest that an individual’s other characteristics, which are 
included in Column (3) and (4), should be controlled for to estimate the effect of the gender of 
offspring appropriately.  
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Table 1.6. Probit Estimations: Son Ratio (Dependent Variable: 0=Working; 1= Retired) 
 
 (1) 
Male 
 (2) 
Female 
 (3) 
Male 
 (4) 
Female 
Ratio of sons 
-0.115
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.085
**
 
(0.041) 
-0.098
***
 
(0.037) 
-0.071
*
 
(0.042) 
Number of children 
-0.059
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.054
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
Age 
0.039
*** 
(0.002) 
0.029
***
 
(0.002) 
0.034
*** 
(0.003) 
0.023
***
 
(0.003) 
Education (1=high school or more)   
0.066
***
 
(0.025) 
0.055
*
 
(0.033) 
Health status (1=bad)   
0.229
***
 
(0.026) 
0.169
***
 
(0.028) 
Employment status (1=self-employed)   
-0.268
***
 
(0.024) 
-0.106
***
 
(0.028) 
Place of residence (1=rural)   
-0.192
***
 
(0.030) 
-0.216
*** 
(0.032) 
Age of the youngest child   
0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Other characteristics
a
 No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,596 1,779 2,596 1,779 
Notes: Marginal effects at means are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Dummies for marital status and spouse’s work status, and logged household net assets. 
 
I also use probit retirement models in estimations by including the variables for the 
number of sons and the number of daughters instead of the ratio of sons and the number of 
children. Table 1.7 reports the probit estimation results. As can be seen in Column (1) of Table 
1.7, the results indicate that an increase by one in the number of sons lowers the probability of 
retirement by 3.4 percentage points for males while the number of daughters has little effect; the 
estimates on the number of sons is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, for the 
females, having an additional son reduces the probability of retirement by 3.4 percentage points 
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Table 1.7. Probit Estimations: Number of Sons (Dependent Variable: 0=Working; 1= Retired) 
 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
Number of sons 
-0.034
**
 
(0.016) 
-0.034
*
 
(0.018) 
Number of daughters 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
Age 
0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
0.024
***
 
(0.003) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
0.065
***
 
(0.025) 
0.055
*
 
(0.033) 
Health status (1=bad) 
0.228
***
 
(0.026) 
0.169
***
 
(0.028) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
-0.267
*** 
(0.024) 
-0.106
***
 
(0.028) 
Place of residence (1=rural) 
-0.192
***
 
(0.030) 
-0.214
***
 
(0.032) 
Age of the youngest child 
0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,596 1,779 
Notes: Marginal effects at means are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Dummies for marital status, spouse’s work status, and residence, and logged household net assets. 
 
(p-value = 0.054) while the number of daughters has almost no effect. The results imply that 
elderly parents’ labor supply positively increases in response to sons, but does not increase in 
response to daughters. These effects are consistent with the results of previous estimations which 
suggest the ratio of sons to the number of children reduces the probability of parents’ retirement.  
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To test whether the “son effect” on parents’ retirement is heterogeneous according to 
child birth order, dummies for the gender of each child are included with a dummy for the 
number of children controlled for in the estimation model. Although an extensive literature has 
explored the birth order effect on children’s education or health in developed countries, 
conclusions are mixed (Hauser and Sewell, 1985; Kessler, 1991; Black et al., 2005; Wang et al., 
2007, Booth and Kee, 2009; Bu, 2014; Lundborg, Nilsson, and Rooth, 2014). Regarding this 
issue, several studies propose the causal mechanism of the birth order effect including time 
constraints, disciplinary restrictions, or endowment effect (Price, 2008; Hotz and Pantano, 2015; 
Black et al., 2005). On the other hand, in some developing countries where son preference 
prevails, the eldest son may receive more investment from parents because economic linkages 
between parents and children were traditionally stronger with the eldest son. However, if the 
implicit contract between parents and the eldest son are eroding, parents with a first-born child 
who is male are likely to retire later relative to other parents.  
Table 1.8 reports the estimated influence of male offspring on the probability of parents’ 
retirement reflecting child birth order. For both male and female workers, the effect due to 
child’s gender is established in the case of the first child. If the first-born child is male, it leads to 
a 4.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of retirement for fathers, and a 4.9 percentage 
point decrease for mothers; the estimates of the impact of the first child’s gender is statistically 
significant at the 10% level for both male and female workers. In contrast, no child gender effect 
is found in the second or higher birth orders. These results likely reflect the fact that parents 
invested more household resources especially in the first-born male child than other children, but 
this son may support elderly parents less robustly than might traditionally have been expected. 
 
24 
 
Table 1.8. Probit Estimations: Gender Effects by Birth Order (Dependent Variable: 
0=Working; 1=Retired) 
 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
1
ST
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise) 
-0.041
*
 
(0.023) 
-0.049
*
 
(0.026) 
2
nd
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise) 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
3
rd
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.016 
(0.035) 
4
th
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise) 
-0.036 
(0.048) 
0.010 
(0.048) 
5
th
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise) 
-0.088 
(0.073) 
-0.091 
(0.068) 
Age 
0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
0.024
***
 
(0.003) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
0.069
***
 
(0.025) 
0.055 
(0.033) 
Health status (1=bad) 
0.229
***
 
(0.026) 
0.173
***
 
(0.028) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
-0.268
***
 
(0.025) 
-0.109
***
 
(0.028) 
Place of residence (1=rural) 
-0.190
***
 
(0.030) 
-0.211
***
 
(0.032) 
Age of the youngest child 
0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
0.005
*
 
(0.003) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes 
 Obs. 2,596 1,779 
Notes: Marginal effects at means are reported. The effects of the 6
th
 or over child gender are omitted. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level, respectively.  
a
 Dummies for the number of children, marital status, employment status, spouse’s working, and 
residence, and logged household net assets. 
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 1.5.2  Impact on Working Hours 
Workers may choose to increase their labor supply by increasing their working hours instead of 
postponing retirement if they cannot adjust retirement age easily. Thus, weekly working hours 
are utilized as another dependent variable in estimating the effect of the gender of offspring on 
labor supply. In this context, I employ a tobit model censored at zero; the retirees’ weekly 
working hours is zero. The variable 
*h  is a latent variable for weekly working hours, which is 
given by the following function for individual i by: 
*
0 1i i X ih chgender X     , 
*max(0, )i iH h ,                (1.8) 
where 
ichgender and iX  are defined the same as those in equation (1.6) and iH denotes the 
observed weekly working hours. Exclusion of the samples without the variable for weekly 
working hours leaves 4,349 samples (2,589 males and 1,760 females) in the collection. In the 
samples, average weekly working hours are 44.0 and 39.8 for male and female workers in 2014, 
respectively. 
Table 1.9 reports the results of the tobit estimation. The results show that male workers 
tend to work more by an average of 5.0 hours per week when all children are sons; this is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Considering males’ average weekly working hours of 
44.0, this result implies that a father’s weekly working hours increase by 11.3 percent if all 
children are sons. The magnitude of the coefficient for females is similar. Table 1.10 reports the 
tobit estimates of another specification in which the variables for the number of sons and the 
number of daughters are used. The results find that an additional son increases weekly working 
hours of the fathers by 1.8 hours (p-value = 0.044); it implies that one additional son leads to an 
increase in weekly hours worked by 4.1 percent. However, the number of daughters has a much 
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Table 1.9. Tobit Estimations: Son Ratio (Dependent Variable: Weekly Working Hours) 
 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
Ratio of sons 
4.983
**
 
(2.016) 
5.318
**
 
(2.612) 
Number of children 
1.090 
(0.751) 
1.558
*
 
(0.886) 
Age 
-2.267
***
 
(0.176) 
-1.980
***
 
(0.211) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
-4.041
***
 
(1.633) 
-0.910 
(1.996) 
Health status (1=bad) 
-14.602
***
 
(1.633) 
-10.527
***
 
(1.926) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
16.686
***
 
(1.298) 
11.217
***
 
(1.693) 
Place of residence (1=rural) 
9.792
***
 
(1.537) 
11.440
***
 
(1.876) 
Age of the youngest child 
-0.335
**
 
(0.159) 
-0.161 
(0.190) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,589 1,760 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Dummies for marital status, spouse’s work status, and residence, and logged household net assets. 
smaller effect (0.3 hours) and is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.661). For women, 
having an additional son leads to an increase of 2.7 hours (6.8 percent) in weekly hours worked, 
while the effect of an additional daughter is not significant (p-value = 0.478). Regarding child 
birth order, the effect of a first-born male child eldest son is present for females, but not for 
males. However, these results are not reported due to the lack of reliability. 
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Table 1.10. Tobit Estimations: Number of Sons (Dependent Variable: Weekly Working Hours) 
 (1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
Number of sons 
1.816
**
 
(0.936) 
2.673
**
 
(1.164) 
Number of daughters 
0.312 
(0.782) 
0.632 
(0.890) 
Age 
-2.280
***
 
(0.176) 
-1.994
***
 
(0.210) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
-4.020
***
 
(1.421) 
-0.937 
(1.996) 
Health status (1=bad) 
-14.618
***
 
(1.633) 
-10.539
***
 
(1.927) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
16.745
*** 
(1.297) 
11.214
***
 
(1.694) 
Place of Residence (1=rural) 
9.792
***
 
(1.542) 
11.351
***
 
(1.878) 
Age of the youngest child 
-0.324
** 
(0.159) 
-0.160 
(0.191) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,589 1,760 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Dummies for marital status, spouse’s work status, and residence, and logged household net assets. 
 
1.5.3  Impact on Age at Retirement 
Whereas the previous two subsections analyze the effect of the child’s gender on both retired and 
working parents, this section estimates the effect on retired parents by using parents’ age at 
retirement as an alternative dependent variable with the OLS estimation model as follows: 
 0 1i i X i iAge chgender X       ,                      (1.8) 
where Age i denotes the respondent’s age at retirement, iX  denotes a set of characteristics 
including dummies for education, marital status, spouse’s working condition, employment status, 
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occupation, gender, and birth cohort
8
, logged labor income, and the age gap between parent and 
the youngest child. All variables are measured at the time of retirement. The number of 
observations are 2,310 (1,338 males; 972 females), and the mean age at retirement is 60.2 (62.3 
for the males; 57.2 for the females). 
Table 1.11 shows the results of the OLS estimation. In column (1), the result indicates 
that the parent’s age at retirement increases by around 1.5 years when all children are sons rather 
than daughters; this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Given that the average 
retirement age is 60.2, the result implies an increase of 2.5 percent in retirement age. Column (2) 
in Table 1.11 shows the retirement age of a parent increases depending on the number of sons, 
but not the number of daughters. The results indicate that an additional son causes his parent to 
delay retirement by nearly 0.7 years (p-value=0.001). By contrast, the effect of the number of 
daughters (0.2 years) is substantially less and is statistically insignificant.  
The “son effect” depending on birth order is also estimated, and the results are shown in 
column (3) of Table 1.11. The results suggest that if the first-born child is a son, then a working 
parent tends to delay retirement by 0.7 years compared to when the first-born child is a daughter. 
This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, having a second son leads to an 
increase of the retirement age of a parent by 0.6 years though this is only marginally significant 
(p-value is 0.107). This “son effect” decreases gradually with the later position in birth order. 
The results of all specifications in this subsection are consistent with the previous results drawn 
from models estimating the impact of the gender of offspring on the probability of retirement and 
weekly working hours. 
                                                 
8
 Dummies for birth cohorts include all respondents who born in the ten-year interval. 
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Table 1.11. OLS Estimations (Dependent Variable: Age at Retirement)  
  (1)  (2)  (3)
b
 
Ratio of sons 
1.474
**
 
(0.577) 
  
Number of sons  
0.673
***
 
(0.198) 
 
Number of daughters  
0.201 
(0.165) 
 
1
st
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise)   
0.711
**
 
(0.356) 
2
nd
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise)   
0.591
†
 
(0.366) 
3
rd
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise)   
0.521 
(0.423) 
4
th
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise)   
0.185 
(0.577) 
5
th
 child’s gender (1 if son, 0 otherwise)   
-0.225 
(0.833) 
Number of children 
0.426
***
 
(0.153) 
 
Dummies 
Included 
Gender (1=male) 
4.278
***
 
(0.441) 
4.296
***
 
(0.441) 
4.267
***
 
(0.443) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
-0.700
*
 
(0.401) 
-0.699
*
 
(0.401) 
-0.770
*
 
(0.405) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
1.697
***
 
(0.408) 
1.703
***
 
(0.408) 
1.679
***
 
(0.411) 
Age gap between parent & youngest child 
0.140
*** 
(0.042) 
0.140
***
 
(0.042) 
0.142
***
 
(0.042) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,310 2,310 2,310 
Adj. R-sq 0.406 0.406 0.409 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. †, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Dummies for public pension enrollment, occupation, marital status, spouse’s work status, and birth 
cohort, and logged labor income; All variables are measured at the time of retirement. 
b
 The effects of the 6
th
 or over child gender are omitted. 
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1.6  Conclusions  
This study examines the relationship between intra-household transfers and the labor supply of 
older parents in Korea by using “child’s gender” as an exogenous variable which leads to 
parents’ differential lifetime net transfers to children. Based on evidence that parental lifetime 
net transfers to sons are larger compared to that to daughters, this study tests if parents with sons 
tend to work more in order to fund these higher transfers. The following four results are obtained 
from various estimation models. First, having sons decreases the probability of parents’ 
retirement, relative to daughters. Second, parents who have sons tend to increase their working 
hours compared to those who have daughters. Third, the retirement age of parents is greater 
when parents have sons rather than daughters. Fourth, this “son effect” is substantial in the case 
of first-born male children. These results support the argument that having sons increases the 
labor supply of elderly parents in Korea, relative to daughters. This study argues that a possible 
mechanism for the differential labor supply of elderly parents according to the gender of 
offspring is the difference in parents’ lifetime net transfer to children between sons and 
daughters. Because parents’ lifetime net transfer to sons is on average larger than to daughters, 
parents with sons may increase their labor supply to make up for income expended in order to 
maintain consumption levels after retirement. 
The “son effect” on the labor supply of elderly parents in Korea may be a unique 
phenomenon occurring in the transition period. Due to son preference or an implicit contract 
between parents and sons, parents traditionally allocate more household resources to sons than to 
daughters. However, in this transition period, elderly parents may not be supported by grown-up 
sons after retirement as much as parents might have expected due to the declining strength of 
familial support systems where sons typically played a key role in supporting their parents, as 
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well as the substantial improvement in women’s socio-economic status in Korea, which 
increases the bargaining power of women in the household. Working in old age does not always 
generate disutility. The involuntary labor supply resulting from an unexpected income loss can, 
however, mean serious distresses to an individual’s welfare. If there is an excess supply of 
elderly labor in the labor market, this may make the matter worse. Accordingly, the results of 
this study have some noteworthy implications for countries like Korea experiencing significant 
old-age poverty in conjunction with a lack of a well-developed social pension system. The costs 
of child-rearing, often hampering parents from saving for retirement should be reduced in order 
to alleviate old-age poverty, especially in the areas of education and the provision of housing for 
newly-wed children. Additionally, policymakers need to pay more attention to elderly parents 
likely to face retirement without sufficient financial preparation due to the transition period: the 
responsibility for supporting the elderly is shifting from family members (particularly sons) to 
the elderly themselves and to the state. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 CHILDCARE LEAVE BENEFITS AND FERTILITY: EVIDENCE FROM 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
2.1  Introduction 
A growing number of studies show the effect of work and work environment on childbearing 
decisions. In developed Western countries, high fertility rates are correlated with a high 
percentage of women performing paid work and pro-family government policies. Accordingly, 
work and family reconciliation policies are on the political agenda of an increasing number of 
countries. 
South Korea (henceforth Korea) presents a noteworthy case. Since the 1960s, Korea has 
experienced a very rapid fertility decline; the total fertility rate (TFR) dropped below the 
population replacement level in 1983 and hovered around 1.6 in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. 
The TFR reached its lowest point (1.08) in 2005 and has stood at around 1.1 to 1.3 since 2005, 
which is one of the lowest TFR in the world. The decline in fertility rates combined with rising 
life expectancy quickened the pace of population aging, which in turn has dramatically increased 
the dependency ratio of the population aged 65 and over, and decreased the proportion of the 
working-age population. Such demographic changes have consequently raised concerns for 
various possible socioeconomic impacts as a result, including a decrease in productive potential, 
reduction in the tax base, and an increase in social security expenditures to support the outsize 
retired population.  
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In response to the precipitous decline in fertility rates, the Korean government initiated a five-
year plan called the “First Basic Plan on Low Fertility and Aged Society” in 2006. A second 
five-year plan with a similar set of policies followed the first plan and concluded in 2015. In 
total, the government invested about USD 800 billion (USD 200 billion for the first plan and 
USD 600 billion for the second plan) from 2006 to 2015 to support a wide variety of policies 
intended to raise the fertility rates including extended maternal and paternal leave, tax benefits 
and health subsidies for childbirth, and childcare leave. Nevertheless, the TFR remained low and 
stagnated at around 1.2 in recent years, leading to the conclusion that the 10-year pro-natal plans 
failed to achieve their goals.  
Several studies investigated the effectiveness of these government policies. However, the 
actual impact has not been documented perhaps due to the empirical challenges of evaluating the 
effectiveness of government policies on actual fertility. Furthermore, previous studies largely 
overlooked the fact that these policies target marital fertility despite the fact that most previous 
literature has been conducted for the TFR, which is calculated using data on unmarried as well as 
married women so this can be misleading. And only a small portion of previous studies focused 
on childcare leave benefits, which might have one of the largest impacts on marital fertility. A 
study that does examine childcare leave benefits is conducted by Yoon and Hong (2014). It 
examines how beneficiaries utilized the changes implemented by the 2011 childcare leave 
benefits reform depending on their level of income. Nonetheless, it does not closely investigate 
the effect of the impact of utilization of the program on fertility, which is the main aim of this 
study. 
 Using the recent data sets, this study contributes to the existing literature by focusing on 
married working women at whom the Korean government has directed specific policy, and by 
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examining actual fertility behavior rather than fertility intention. In 2011, the government 
substantially modified the childcare leave benefit scheme with the stated intention of increasing 
the generosity of financial support during the childcare leave period and promoting an increase in 
the rate at which women return to work following a childcare leave. The changes included the 
level of financial support and criteria for eligibility. The monetary increase in monthly childcare 
benefits provided 40 percent of monthly wages with a minimum of USD 500 and a maximum of 
USD 1,000 compared to a lump sum payment of USD 500 per month prior to the reform. 
Eligibility criteria and changes in the amount of benefits affected women differently depending 
on income level—this identifies the effects of the policy before and after implementation of the 
reform. Utilizing this framework, this study makes causal inferences between the policy and 
fertility. This study also uses education level as a proxy for a monthly wage in alternative 
estimation strategies to determine the labor supply effect of the reform. The results show that the 
reform in childcare leave benefits had a substantial effect on marital fertility as well as 
contraceptive use. The magnitude of the effect varied depending on the number of already 
existing children. The results also find evidence of declining career interruption after the reform. 
The following section briefly reviews the previous literature. Section 2.3 describes the 
reform in childcare leave benefits in more detail. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy and 
the data. Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 present the results. Section 2.7 is the Conclusions. 
 
2.2  Literature Reviews 
 2.2.1  Theoretical Background 
39 
 
The decision to have a child depends on a utility maximization process with a budget constraint 
and thus is a function of the cost and benefits of having a child and household income (Becker, 
1991; Cigno, 1991). It seems that a pro-natal policy has a positive impact on fertility as an 
increase in government support for childbearing such as family allowances, tax exemptions, and 
childcare leave increases demand of a child by lowering the cost of childcare or increasing 
household income. 
However, the theoretical direction of a pro-natal policy is ambiguous due to the quality-
quantity trade-off (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Childbearing has different dimensions: quantity and 
quality. This implies that individuals may choose to focus on the quality of child-raising rather 
than on the quantity of children by concentrating available financial resources. Hence, a pro-
natal policy leading to an increase in income does not necessarily increase fertility. Gauthier 
(2007) suggests more theoretical evidence of the ambiguity of a pro-natal policy impact on 
fertility. First, while rational choice theories assume that an individual has perfect information 
regarding the costs and benefits of having a child, imperfect information may prevail in the real 
economy (Goldthorpe, 2000). In this case, an individual may underestimate or overestimate the 
likelihood of a possible change brought about through financial support for childbearing, 
resulting in inconsistent responses. Also, a childbearing decision may depend on whether or not 
benefits of policies are sufficient for an individual to have more children (Goldthorpe, 2000). 
This suggests that there may be a need to meet some threshold requirement for an individual to 
respond to policy changes. Furthermore, some studies argue that an individual’s decision to have 
children can be affected by other factors such as peers, neighbors, habits, and traditions (Becker, 
1996; Becker and Murphy, 2000). Thus, if policies aimed at increasing fertility are linked to 
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these various factors, predicting the impact of pro-natal policies on fertility becomes more 
complex. 
 2.2.2  Empirical Studies 
As a large number of empirical studies examine the effect of government policies on fertility, the 
scope of this study will focus on recent studies which use more convincing econometric 
methodologies. 
 Kalwij (2010) uses the 2004 European Social Survey and national social expenditure data 
to show the impact of family allowances, parental leave benefits, and childcare subsidies on 
fertility from 1980 to 2003 in 16 Western European countries. The results show that family 
allowance, maternity leave, and childcare subsidies all have a positive effect on fertility rates. 
Nevertheless, the impact is variegated as family allowance has a significant effect only when 
specific independent variables are included, and maternity leave has a significant effect only for 
the first birth. Unfortunately, the study does not provide the reason for the divergent impact. 
A study that encompasses all of Europe and uses the same data is Harknett, Billari, and 
Medalia (2014), which examines data from 2004 to 2005 and 2008 to 2009 to investigate how 
various macroeconomic variables at the national level affect birth intentions within the following 
three years and the actual numbers of children born. Policy variables are divided into four areas: 
labor market, family type, system, and division of labor within the family. In all, the ratio of 
family support budget to GDP, duration of paid maternity leave, education and health system 
satisfaction, unemployment rate, flexible working hours, financial and childcare support among 
grown-up children, the proportion of multi-family households, and division of labor in the 
husband-wife family are included. Other variables such as age, gender, the number of children, 
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the age of children, religion, individual level variables, and other macroeconomic variables are 
also included as controls. The results show that most of the policy variables have a significant 
impact on the decision to have a second child while showing no effect on the decision to have a 
first child. According to the authors, the dependent variable is a mixture of the individual level, 
household level, and national level potentially linked to other national variables that may pose 
endogeneity concerns. 
Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2013) examine the effect of government spending, child 
care services, and paid maternity leave on fertility and tempo-adjusted fertility between 1982 and 
2007 in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries. Other independent variables include the female employment rate, average hours of 
work for women, unemployment rate, labor market protection indicator, the ratio of single 
mothers, and first child indicator. An important feature of this study is to control using various 
methods (two-stage least squares using lag parameters, system GMM, two-way FE model, etc.) 
to alleviate problems such as reverse causality. The results show that policy has a positive impact 
on the fertility rate. In particular, financial support and childcare service policies implemented at 
the time of childbirth appear to be more effective than maternity leave and childbirth support 
policies. 
A study by Lappegård (2010) uses Norwegian population data to determine whether 
various government fertility policies have influenced the birthrate. Policy variables are the use of 
paid maternity leave (equivalent to 80 percent of the wage for 54 weeks or 100 percent of the 
wage for 44 weeks), government support for childcare facilities, and childcare allowance. The 
data are combined with other data sets on income, education, maternity leave, and childcare 
facilities. The author uses a hazard model including regional fixed-effects. The results show that 
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each policy variable had a positive effect on childbirth. In particular, maternity leave had a 
significant effect on the second childbirth while childcare allowance had a greater effect on the 
first childbirth. The data have some merit as they are merged from different sources, but there is 
still a potential endogenous problem in large part due to the reverse causation between maternity 
leave and decision-making around pregnancy. Duvander, Lappegård, and Andersson (2010) 
analyze the relationship between maternity leave and additional births by analyzing Swedish and 
Norwegian data. The results show that in both countries, the use of parental leave is closely 
related to additional births. In addition, in Norway, the use of long-term parental leave by women 
with two children appears to have a positive impact on the third childbirth. 
Milligan (2005) uses the 1991 and 1996 Canadian population census to analyze the effect 
of childcare allowance on birth. Independent variables are age, education, marital status, the 
number of existing children, immigrant status, race, household income, weekly growth rate, 
weekly immigration rate, and provincial education expenditure. Notably, this study employs the 
difference-in-differences (DID) model, using different systems in Quebec and other provinces. In 
Quebec, the amount of the support was raised several times in the 1980s and 1990s, while in 
other provinces, it was not. The results show that the policy is indeed effective in raising the 
birthrate. In particular, if the number of existing children is higher than two, the probability of 
additional birth increases by 25 percent. This study is unique as Quebec's policy has applied the 
DID technique to solve the problems of endogeneity, but it is still possible that unobserved 
characteristics of Quebec may have provided factors in increasing the fertility rate. A study by 
Ang (2015) uses similar data and the DID technique to analyze the effects of maternity leave and 
childcare allowance on the birthrate and female labor force participation using Canadian 
population census and Labor Force Survey data. The analysis shows that maternity leave 
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positively affects childbirth and labor market participation rate of women, but childcare 
allowances are not significant. This paper also proposes to solve the problems of existing papers, 
but it is also not free from the limitations present in Milligan (2005). 
 Brewer, Ratcliffe, and Smith (2012) use data from the Family Resource Survey and the 
Family Expenditure Survey (1995-2004) to determine the effect of the Working Families' Tax 
Credit (WFTC) on birth in the U.K. The WFTC is a support system that grants tax benefits 
according to the number of children in a family. It increased benefits in 1999. The benefits 
mainly target low-income families. Similar to the Canadian case, the study uses the DID 
technique to compare birthrates before and after the implementation of the policy. The results of 
the analysis show that the policy had a positive effect on the birthrates for married women, but 
not for women without a spouse.  
González (2013) uses Spanish national statistics, household expenditure surveys, monthly 
labor force surveys, etc. to determine the effect of the childbirth subsidy system on the number of 
monthly pregnancies and monthly abortion rate. The study uses the regression discontinuity 
design to model policy variables. The analysis shows that the policy had a positive impact on 
childbirth and it also shows that abortion rates declined. The policy also appears to have reduced 
labor supply after childbirth, meaning the labor supply and birth subsidy are substitutive. Studies 
by Azmat and González (2010) also show that Spain's income tax reform increases the fertility 
rate by about 5 percent and increases the employment rate of women with children under the age 
of 3 by about 2 percent. 
Drago et al. (2011) use data from 2001-2006 Household Income and Labor Dynamics to 
analyze how the baby bonus affected birth intentions. A child allowance has been paid in 
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Australian dollars of $3000 per child for children born after July 2004, regardless of income, 
parents' employment status, or birth order. In July 2006 it was increased to $4,000 and again rose 
to $5,000 in July 2008. Additionally, from 2009 the high-income bracket was excluded. An IV-
Probit and a simultaneous equation model were used, in which the authors specifically focus on 
the interaction of policy and birth intentions. The results show that the child allowance has a 
significant effect on birth intention. This paper focuses on the interaction between policy and 
childbirth. However, as the authors suggest, there may be an indication that individuals may not 
respond immediately to the incentive for childbirth in time, since individuals may have an 
intention to have children after they have already met all other desirable conditions such as 
employment and adequate savings. In particular, when the system was introduced in 2004, a plan 
for raising subsidies in July 2006 was also announced. 
Cygan-Rehm (2016) uses the 2001/2002- 2006/2007 German data to investigate the 
effects of maternity benefits on additional births using the DID technique. The results show that 
maternity benefits have a significant impact on the timing of additional births. Bauerschuster, 
Hener, and Rainer (2013) also analyze the impact of public childcare facility use on the total 
fertility rate using German regional data for children under the age of three. The results also 
show positive effects. 
Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov (2013) analyze the impact of the child support subsidies 
on pregnancy outcomes using panel data from the 1995-1999 State Statistics Service of Israel. 
The fixed-effects method was used as an analysis model. The child support subsidy was 
introduced in Israel in 1959 as a government subsidy for children under the age of 18. Prior to 
2003, the subsidy price had risen sharply, starting with the third child. However, as a part of 
fiscal reform, the benefits for the third child born after 2003 was lowered to the same level as all 
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other children. The increase and decrease in the subsidy for children show a significant effect on 
birthrates, but the effect was relatively low in the high-income group. 
Slonimczyk and Yurko (2014) analyze the effect of a maternity capital program on 
birthrates using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data from 2000 to 2011 and using 
the DID. The maternity capital system was introduced in January 2007 and was in force until 
2016. This system grants the right to receive a certain level of financial support, linked to the 
annual inflation rate, when a woman has two or more children. The average benefits per 
household in 2007-2012 is about USD 11,000, and the fund usage conditions at the time the 
system was introduced allow spending only for the purpose of housing purchases, child 
education, and parenting after the birth of the third child. The results show that the policy has a 
significant effect on the second and subsequent births. There was a change in other maternity 
support schemes (maternity leave, maternity subsidies, etc.) at that time, which raises the issues 
of the comparison group trends. To address this issue, the authors provide additional analysis 
using a dynamic stochastic model. 
Using DID methodology, Yoon and Hong (2014) examine how the 2011 reform in 
childcare leave benefits affected lower-wage workers and higher-wage workers differently. It 
uses the Employment Insurance Data Base which spans 2009-2011. The results show that these 
policy changes increase the use of childcare leave in the treatment group (the higher-wage 
workers). However, it does not examine whether the policy changes had any impact on fertility. 
An increase in the utilization of childcare leave benefits does not necessarily mean more fertility. 
Another difference in Yoon and Hong (2014) from the current study is that they analyze a 
relatively short time period. Given that it usually takes time for a new policy to be recognized 
and take full effect, the question needs to be studied over a longer period of time.  
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2.3  Reform in Korea's Paid Childcare Leave System  
The focus of this study is the 2011 reform in childcare leave benefits in Korea. The government 
introduced a paid childcare leave scheme in 2001 to provide financial support for employees 
experiencing a substantial decrease in labor income while on childcare leave. An employee with 
a child under the age of eight, or in school in second grade or below, is entitled to paid childcare 
leave. To be eligible, workers must have been employed for more than one year consecutively, 
up to the day prior to when childcare leave is supposed to begin. Under this system, conditions of 
household income or children’s birth orders are not taken into account. The maximum period of 
paid childcare leave is one year. Both the father and mother of the child are eligible as long as 
the periods of the leave do not overlap, but the majority of parents who utilize childcare leave are 
mothers. The Employment Insurance Fund operated by the government is the source of benefits. 
The level of childcare leave benefits gradually increased from USD 300
9
 per month in 2001-
2003 to USD 400 per month in 2004-2006, and to USD 500 per month in 2007-2010.  
  In 2011, a significant reform aimed at reducing the financial burden of childcare and 
preventing career interruptions for women following childbirth was introduced. This reform was 
announced in the “Second Basic Plan on Low Fertility and Aging Society” in November 2010 
and went into effect on January 1, 2011. The most substantial change was the level of financial 
benefits, which changed from a monthly lump sum payment of USD 500 to a payment equivalent 
to 40 percent of ordinary monthly wages. The minimum monthly payment was set at USD 500 to 
prevent reduced payments following the reform, and the maximum payment was capped at USD 
1,000. Thus, the exact amount depended on monthly wages and duration of the childcare leave. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between monthly wages and childcare benefits before and after  
                                                 
9
 This study assumes the exchange rate between Korean won and U.S. dollar as fixed: 1 dollar = 1,000 won. 
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Figure 2.1. Monthly 
Wage and Childcare 
Leave Benefits before 
and after the Reform 
 
 
the 2011 reform. The 2011 reform increased childcare benefits for the relatively higher wage 
group with a monthly wage of over USD 1,250 while having no effect on the lower wage group 
with a monthly wage of USD 1,250 or less. The government also introduced an incentive system 
to encourage women to return to their former workplace after childcare leave as a substantial 
number (34.2 percent in 2009) of women workers quit or changed jobs following childcare leave. 
Under this new incentive system, 85 percent of monthly childcare benefits are paid during the 
leave, and the remaining 15 percent of benefits are paid to those who return to their former 
workplace and stay for at least six months. However, if 85 percent of monthly benefits fall below 
USD 500, the program does not apply, thereby avoiding a decrease in payments during the leave. 
Figure 2.2 presents the number of childcare leave enrollees and the total amount of leave 
payment from 2005 to 2015. Both have gradually increased over time and showed a fairly rapid 
increase immediately after the reform was implemented in 2011. The average amount of benefits 
per enrollee during the whole leave period rose from USD 4,268 in 2010 to USD 7,049 in 2015, 
and the average duration of childcare leave increased from 8.4 months in 2010 to 10 months in 
2015.  
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Figure 2.2. Users of 
Childcare Leave and 
the Total Amount of 
Leave Payments 
 
                                                       Source: the Ministry of Employment and Labor, Republic of Korea 
             (https://www.ei.go.kr). 
 
 
2.4  Empirical Strategy and Data 
 2.4.1  Empirical Strategy 
To examine the effect of the reform, this study employs the DID approach. I compare the post-
reform change in the probability of conception among women in the treatment group to the 
change in the probability of conception among the women in the control group over the same 
period. Identification in the DID model relies heavily on the common trends assumption that 
requires the treatment and control group to follow the same trends in conception before the 
reform. Thus, I restrict the samples to female wage and salary workers
10
.  
 This study defines the treatment group and control group using two factors. The first 
factor is the amount of monthly earnings. Only wage and salary workers who earn more than 
                                                 
10
 The data shows that the conception trend for non-working or self-employed women prior to the reform is quite 
different from that of female wage and salary workers. 
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USD 1,250 per month are affected by the reform in childcare benefits. In contrast, wage and 
salary workers who earn USD 1,250 or less per month are not affected by the reform; thus, they 
are the control group. The second factor is the employment status of the wage and salary 
workers. The Korean government labor statistics categorize wage and salary workers into two 
groups: regular and non-regular workers. Regular workers are defined as employees who have 
unlimited or more than one- or more-year employment contract and have received benefits such 
as a bonus, retirement benefits, etc. Wage and salary workers who are not regular workers are 
categorized as non-regular workers, which include temporary and daily workers. Both regular 
and non-regular workers are officially entitled to paid childcare leave. In reality, however, very 
few non-regular workers use childcare leave. This is for several reasons: first, paid childcare 
leave eligibility requires an employee to have worked consecutively for a period exceeding one 
year, but most non-regular workers do not meet this requirement. Second, non-regular workers 
tend not to subscribe to Employment Insurance
11
, which is required for eligibility. Third, non-
regular workers are often concerned about a potential job loss if they were to take childcare 
leave, although it is illegal for employers to fire workers for taking childcare leave. Park (2016) 
reports that only 1.9 percent of non-regular workers used childcare leave in 2011-2015 compared 
to 46.9 percent of regular workers. 
Based on these two factors, the treatment group in this study includes regular workers 
who earn more than USD 1,250 per month, and the control group consists of regular workers 
who earn less than USD 1,250 per month or non-regular workers earning any amount of monthly 
wage. 
                                                 
11
 According to the Korean Employment Insurance Act, all workplaces employing one worker or more are subject 
to the Employment Insurance System. However, a substantial portion of non-workers do not subscribe to it. 
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 2.4.2  Data 
I use the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 National Fertility and Family Health Survey as data sets. 
This is a national cross-sectional survey conducted triennially by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare and the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. The survey interviews married 
women
12
 aged 19-49 from approximately 6,000-10,000 households. I exclude separated or 
divorced women because the questions on conception, birth, and contraception were not posed to 
such women at the time of the survey. The sample size of each survey varies depending on the 
year; thus weights are applied. The survey contains information on pregnancies, births, use of 
contraception, health status, employment, and other household attributes. I restrict the samples to 
female wage and salary workers aged 19-49, and the total number of collected sample is 11,416. 
The 2006 and 2009 surveys represent the “before” periods while the 2012 and 2015 surveys 
stand for the “after” period in the DID approach. 
Despite its representativeness and comprehensiveness, the data do have some limitations. 
The data contains little retrospective information on wages, though fertility history is reported 
extensively. Thus, there is a chronological gap in attempting to match women’s fertility 
information and wages. For instance, as shown in Table 2.1, the 2009 survey was conducted in 
June 2009 and contains information on average wages during the three months prior to the as 
conceptions and births from January 2007 to June 2009. The other surveys have a similar survey: 
from April 2009 to June 2009. However, the survey asks about fertility information such 
chronological gap as well. Given the causal inference of this study—that the childbearing 
decisions of women are affected by the level of monthly wages they earn—a large gap in time 
                                                 
12
 Childbirth by unmarried women is fairly exceptional in Korea. 
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Table 2.1. Time of Each Survey 
 Date surveyed 
Fertility history 
(Conceptions, Births) 
Wage 
(Avg. 3 months prior to the survey) 
Survey 2006 Jun.2006 Lifetime Apr.-Jun.2006 
Survey 2009 Jun.2009 Jan.2007-Jun.2009 Apr.-Jun.2009 
Survey 2012 Apr.2012 Jan.2010-Apr.2012 Feb.-Apr.2012 
Survey 2015 Aug.2015 Lifetime Jun.-Aug.2015 
Source: the National Fertility and Family Health Survey. 
 
between these two variables may affect the results. Therefore, in order to narrow this gap as 
much as possible, this study uses “conception13” instead of “birth” as a dependent variable and 
restricts the period of analysis to 12 months: one calendar year before the date surveyed (see 
Table 2.2). Despite this, a maximum possible 16-month gap can still exist between conception 
and wages information. Therefore, the study assumes that wages do not change during for the 
period studied. 
Table 2.2. Time Period of Analysis 
 Conceptions Wage 
Survey 2006 2005 Apr.-Jun.2006 
Survey 2009 2008 Apr.-Jun.2009 
Survey 2012 2011 Feb.-Apr.2012 
Survey 2015 2014 Jun.-Aug.2015 
 
                                                 
13
 By employing conception rather than birth as a dependent variable, the gap between the time of fertility decision 
and wages is reduced by around 40 weeks. 
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 Figure 2.3 illustrates the work status categorization of women in the observations where 
45.7 percent of female wage and salary workers are regular workers who earn a wage of more 
than USD 1,250 per month, and 15.9 percent of female wage and salary workers are regular 
workers who earn a wage of USD 1,250 or less. The portion of non-regular workers is 38.4 
percent. Consequently, 54.3 percent of the samples belong to the control group, and the share of 
the treatment group in the samples is 45.7 percent. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Work Status 
Categorization in the Samples 
 
 
 Note: Calculated by the authors using the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 
2015 National Fertility and Family Health Survey. 
 
 Table 2.3 shows the means and standard deviations for the dependent variable and some 
key control variables separated by the control and treatment group before and after the reform. 
As expected, the level of education, wages, and household income of the treatment group are 
higher than those of the control group. Whereas the probability of conception for the control 
group declined from 3.2 percent in the pre-reform period to 2.1 percent in the post-reform period, 
that of the treatment group increased from 8.1 percent to 9.2 percent. It seems that there is a 
somewhat significant impact on conception in the treatment group, relative to the control group.  
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics (Wage and Salary Workers Aged 19-49) 
 Control group Treatment group 
Variable 
2005 & 2008 
(Before) 
2011 & 2014 
(After) 
2005 & 2008 
(Before) 
2011 & 2014 
(After) 
Conception (%) 3.2 2.1 8.1 9.2 
Age 
39.5 
(6.3) 
40.8 
(5.8) 
36.6 
(6.4) 
39.1 
(6.2) 
Age ( if they conceive) 
31.7 
(4.9) 
33.4 
(5.2) 
30.9 
(3.8) 
32.8 
(3.7) 
Number of children 
1.8 
(0.8) 
1.8 
(0.8) 
1.4 
(0.9) 
1.5 
(0.9) 
Number of children ( if conceive) 
0.9 
(0.9) 
0.9 
(0.8) 
0.5 
(0.6) 
0.8 
(1.0) 
Education (College or above =1) 
0.2 
(0.4) 
0.4 
(0.5) 
0.7 
(0.5) 
0.7 
(0.5) 
Monthly wages (US$) 
966 
(514) 
1,150 
(594) 
2,333 
(1,060) 
2,445 
(1,171) 
Household incomes (US$)  
3,228 
(1,407) 
4,427 
(1,926) 
5,203 
(2,269) 
6,123 
(2,972) 
Observations 2,912 3,265 1,419 3,824 
Notes: Calculated by the authors using the National Fertility and Family Health Survey. Displayed are the 
means or percent for each variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses. The control group includes 
employees who are non-regular workers with monthly wages of $1,250 or less, or non-regular workers, and 
the treatment group includes employees who are regular workers with monthly wages of more than $1,250. 
 
 
2.5  Results  
 2.5.1  The Impact on Conception 
  Descriptive Analysis 
If we expect economic incentives to matter in stimulating fertility, then an increase in the 
probability of conception in the treatment group should be observed after the reform. Figure 2.4  
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Figure 2.4. Probability of Conception in Women Aged 19-49 (Wage and Salary Workers) 
Panel A. Full samples Panel B. No children at conception 
  
Panel C. One child at conception Panel D. Two or more children at conception 
  
Note: Calculated by the authors using the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 National Fertility and Family 
Health Survey. 
 
displays the probability trend of conception in both the control and treatment groups, dividing 
the sampled women by the number of children they've had. The conception trends in the control 
and treatment group are relatively similar before the policy changes, in all cases. After the policy 
changes, the probability of conception in the treatment group seems to increase more than in the 
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control group in full samples. The impacts of the policy are clear in cases where a woman has no 
children or two or more children in 2014.  
However, this descriptive analysis does not always provide accurate results since it does 
not control for other factors which are likely to affect fertility decisions. Thus, I capture the 
policy impact more precisely by using a multivariate DID regression in the following subsection. 
  Regression Analysis 
To estimate the impact of the reform, this study uses the following equation: 
0 1 2 3( )i i i i i i iY After Treatment After Treatment X            ,         (2.1) 
The outcome of interest here is the binary variable ( iY ), which is equal to one if the woman 
conceived in the previous calendar year, and equal to zero otherwise. The basic DID 
specification includes a binary variable iAfter  which is equal to one in the post-reform period 
and equal to zero in the pre-reform period. Similarly, the binary variable iTreatment is equal to 
one if the woman belongs to the treatment group and equal to zero otherwise. An interaction 
term i iAfter Treatment captures the difference in the change in the probability of conception 
after the reform for the treatment group compared to the control group. Thus, the coefficient 3  
represents the effect of the reform. iX  is a vector of individual characteristics, which are 
assumed to be related to the conception decision. iX  includes age, age squared, the number of 
already existing children at conception, education, a place of residence, employment status, 
husband’s work status, logged labor income, and logged household income. Equation (2.1) is 
estimated by the linear probability model.   
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Table 2.4. Regression Results: Conception 
 (1) 
After × Treatment 
  0.037
***
 
(0.012) 
After 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Treatment 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
Age 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Age
2
 
0.00002 
(0.0008) 
Number of existing children
a
  
    One child 
  -0.115
***
 
(0.018) 
    Two or more children 
  -0.144
***
 
(0.016) 
Education (College or above =1) 
  0.021
***
 
(0.005) 
Other characteristics
b
 Yes 
Observations 11,416 
Adj. R-squared 0.119 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Reference: No children. 
b
 Dummies for employment status, region, and husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and 
household income (logged). 
 
Regression results, reported in Table 2.4, show a statistically significant increase in the 
conception for the treatment group after the reform compared to the control group. The 
coefficient is 3.7 percent which implies that the probability of conception increased by 45.6 
percent
14
 in the treatment group as a result of the reform. On the other hand, a large number of 
studies find that policy impacts on fertility vary by birth order. For example, in one finding, 
                                                 
14
 In the raw data, the probability of conception in the treatment group before the reform was 8.1 percent. 
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financial incentives have a greater effect on first and third births (Brewer et al., 2012; Laroque 
and Salanie, 2008; Berrington, 2004). The authors argue that these results reflect strong 
underlying preferences for having two children. Thus, the decision to have a second child is less 
likely to be responsive to financial incentives than the decision to have the first child or third or 
higher-order child. Accordingly, I run the regressions by the number of already existing children 
in the family. The estimation results in this study show that, in response to the reform, the  
probability of conception for women with no children or more than two children rises 
significantly: by 10.1 percentage points and 3.8 percentage points, respectively (see Table 2.5). 
Given that the probabilities of conception for the treatment group before the reform are 22.2  
Table 2. 5. Regression Results by the Number of Existing Children: Conception 
 (1) 
No children 
(2) 
One child 
(3) 
Two or more children 
After × Treatment 
  0.101
**
 
(0.050) 
-0.008 
(0.035) 
  0.038
***
 
(0.007) 
After 
-0.007 
(0.037) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
 -0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
Treatment 
0.011 
(0.045) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
   -0.025
***
 
(0.006) 
Age 
  0.039
**
 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
   -0.036
***
 
(0.007) 
Age
2
 
  -0.0007
***
 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
   0.0004
***
 
(0.0009) 
Education (College or above =1) 
0.050
*
 
(0.028) 
  0.033
**
 
(0.013) 
  0.015
***
 
(0.003) 
Other characteristics
a
 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,417 2,202 7,797 
Adj. R-squared 0.071 0.048 0.056 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Dummies for employment status, region, the number of existing children(only in (3)), and 
husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and household income (logged). 
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percent for women with no children and 1.1 percent for women with more than two children, 
these results seem to be sizable. 
 Table 2.6 shows the estimated effects when the interaction terms for the treatment group 
with each year's dummy are included. Column (1) of Table 2.6 shows that there are positive 
effects on conception for the treatment group after the reform compared to 2008. The most 
statistically significant effect (with a p-value of 0.000) is in the year 2014: a 4.7 percentage point 
increase in the probability of conception. The impact in the year 2011 is a 4.0 percentage point 
increase with a 10 percent significance level. By contrast, there is no significant effect in the pre-
reform period (the year 2005), and the magnitude of its coefficient is smallest. I also separately 
run the regressions by the number of existing children. The results find that there is a significant 
positive effect in the year 2014 in cases where there were no children in the family already: a 
12.6 percentage point increase. There are also positive effects in both the year 2011 and the year  
Table 2.6. Heterogeneous Effects over Time: Conception 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
No children 
(3) 
One child 
(4) 
Two or more children 
Treatment × Year 2005
a
 
0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.068) 
0.025 
(0.043) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
Treatment × Year 2011
a
 
0.040
*
 
(0.022) 
0.062 
(0.079) 
0.032 
(0.072) 
  0.018
***
 
(0.006) 
Treatment × Year 2014
a
 
  0.047
***
 
(0.012) 
 0.126
**
 
(0.063) 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
  0.053
***
 
(0.007) 
Other characteristics
b
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,416 1,417 2,202 7,797 
Adj. R-squared 0.120 0.072 0.068 0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.
 
 
a
 Reference: Treatment × Year 2008. 
b
 Dummies for treatment, year, employment status, region, the number of existing children(in (1), (3)), 
and husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and household income (logged). 
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2014 in families with two or more children: a 1.8 percentage point increase and a 5.3 percentage 
point increase, respectively. 
2.5.2  The Impact on Contraception 
Levin (2002) argues that contraceptive use is one stage in the “fertility decision tree”, which 
includes sexual activity, contraception, pregnancy, abortion and birth, and consistent results in 
different stages augment the reliability of evaluation studies. This study employs the “use of 
contraception” as an alternative dependent variable. The value of this variable is equal to one if a 
woman reports contraception use at the time of the interview
15
 or equal to zero otherwise. I 
estimate a linear probability model using the same DID regression model as the one in the 
previous subsection. 
Column (1) of Table 2.7 shows that there was a 3.7 percentage point decrease in 
contraceptive use by the treatment group after the reform, compared to the control group. The 
negative sign of the coefficient might suggest an increase in the intention to have a child. This 
result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of -3.7 percentage points 
implies that the use of contraception decreased by 4.5 percent
16
 in the treatment group due to the 
reform. Column (2) of Table 2.7 shows the policy effects from the DID estimation where the 
interaction terms for the treatment group with each year's dummy are included. The negative 
effect (-3.4 percentage points) in 2015 is statistically significant at the 10 percent level compared 
to 2009, while the effect in 2012 is also negative, but not statistically significant (with a p-value 
of 0.185). The effect in 2006 is not significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient is closer to 
                                                 
15
 Unlike conception, contraception data are from 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 since the surveys ask whether or not 
the women use contraception as of the date of the interview. 
16
 The probability of using contraception in the treatment group before the reform was 85.3 percent. 
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zero. These regression results are consistent with the results of the previous regression model, 
which uses “conception” as the dependent variable.   
Table 2.7. Regression Results: Use of Contraception 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment  × After  
   -0.037
***
 
(0.014) 
 
Treatment  × Year 2006
a
  
0.003 
(0.021) 
Treatment  × Year 2012
a
  
-0.028 
(0.021) 
Treatment  × Year 2015
a
  
-0.034
*
 
(0.018) 
Age 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
Age2 
-0.00006 
(0.00009) 
-0.00005 
(0.00009) 
Number of existing children
b
   
   One child 
   0.320
***
 
(0.022) 
   0.321
***
 
(0.022) 
   Two or more children 
   0.483
***
 
(0.021) 
   0.483
***
 
(0.021) 
Education (College or above =1) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Other characteristics
c
 Yes Yes 
Observations 10,627 10,627 
Adj. R-squared 0.216 0.217 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Reference: Treatment × Year 2009. 
b
 Reference: No children. 
c
 Dummies for treatment, after(in (1)), year(in (2)), employment status, region, and husband’s work 
status, monthly wage (logged) and household income (logged). 
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2.6  Further Analysis: Considering the Impact on Labor Supply 
There is often a strong link between fertility policies and female labor force participation 
(Gauthier, 2007). Moreover, the 2011 reform in Korean childcare leave benefits aims at not only 
increasing financial support for families with children but also lowering career interruptions for 
women after having given birth. If these intended effects are substantial in the treatment group 
post-reform, it may be causing a sizable policy effect, captured in the previous analysis (an 
increase in conception by 45.6 percent). In other words, the estimated policy effects of in DID 
approach may be biased upward if the probability of quitting work after childbirth shrinks more 
in the treatment group than the control group post-reform. It may stem from selection bias in that 
women who quit their jobs after childbirth are excluded from the samples because they are not 
classified as workers in the data sets.  
In order to estimate the policy effect appropriately, therefore, it is essential to examine 
how the reform affects women’s career interruptions comparing the control and treatment group. 
The National Fertility and Family Health Survey data contain information on the work status of 
women before and after childbirth. It does not include any retrospective wage information on 
past jobs, however. As a result, it is impossible to sort the women who left their jobs who were 
regular workers before childbirth into the control and treatment group by the level of monthly 
wages. Instead, I use education
17
 as a proxy for monthly wages to classify regular workers for 
the control or treatment group. The treatment group includes regular workers whose education 
level is equal to college or higher (high education), while the control group includes regular 
workers whose level of education is below college (low education) and non-regular workers of 
                                                 
17
 Brewer et al. (2012) argue that education is a good proxy for income to define treatment and control group 
because education is not affected by pro-natal policies in the short term at least. 
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any education level. The potential weakness of using education as a proxy for monthly wages is 
that it may be less strongly associated with the impact of the reform.
18
 This may be a limitation 
of our study. Table 2.8 shows how closely education is correlated to monthly wages in the data 
sets, summarizing the mean and median wage of regular workers by their education level. As 
expected, the mean and median wage of regular workers with high education is around 50-60 
percent higher than that of regular workers with low education. This suggests that education 
level is quite valid as a proxy for monthly wages. 
 Figure 2.5 illustrates the percentage of women who quit their jobs after childbirth among 
all workers and pregnant workers, respectively. This figure confirms the considerable drop in job 
discontinuity in the treatment group and a slight increase in the control group after the reform. 
For example, the ratio of women who quit work after childbirth, to pregnant women in total, 
decreased from around 26 percent pre-reform to around 8 percent post-reform in the treatment 
group, while it increased from around 31 percent to around 40 percent in the control group. This 
implies that estimations of the policy impact on conception in the previous section can be biased 
upward. In order to correct the potential bias of the previous results, I estimate the equation (2.1), 
including women who left the workforce, by using education level as a proxy for a monthly 
wage.  
Table 2.8. Monthly Wages of Regular Workers by Education 
 Proportion Mean Wage S.D. Median Wage 
Regular workers with low 
education 
38.4% $1,500 $770 $1,350 
Regular workers with high 
education 
61.6% $2,410 $1,250 $2,000 
Notes: Calculated by the authors using the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 National Fertility and Family 
Health Survey. 
                                                 
18
 There are some women with high (low) education whose monthly wage is below (above) USD 1,250. 
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Figure 2.5. The Percentage of Women Who Quit Their Jobs after Childbirth  
Panel A. Among All Workers Panel B. Among Pregnant Workers 
  
Note: Calculated by the authors using the 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 National Fertility and Family 
Health Survey. 
 
Table 2.9 shows the main regression results from the DID approach where the control 
and treatment group are defined by employment status and education level. The results show a 
3.0 percent point increase in conception among all samples, although the significance of this 
result is somewhat less than the result in the previous section. An increase of 3.0 percent points 
means that the probability of conception increased by 22.9 percent in the treatment group as a 
result of the reform. The magnitude of the policy effect is reduced from 45.6 percent to 22.9 
percent after including job discontinuities in the estimation.  
When I run regression separately by the number of existing children, the policy effect on 
women who have no children substantially decreases, from 10.1 percentage points in section 2.5 
to 3.6 percentage points in Column (1) of Table 2.10, and becomes not statistically significant. 
This results from the fact that around 80 percent of job discontinuities occur with the first birth in 
the sample; the potential upward bias in Section 2.5 is indeed substantial in cases of women with 
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no children at the time of reported conception. However, the positive policy effect of the reform 
(a 3.0 percentage point increase) in cases of families with two or more children is still 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (see Column (3) of Table 2.10). In order to examine 
the heterogeneous policy effects over time, I include interaction terms for the treatment group 
with each year's dummy in the estimation model. 
Table 2.9. Regression Results: Including Women Who Left the Workforce after Childbirth              
(Dependent Variable: Conception) 
 (1) 
After × Treatment 
 0.030
**
 
(0.014) 
After 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Treatment 
0.020
*
 
(0.011) 
Age 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
Age
2
 
0.00009 
(0.0008) 
Number of existing children
a
  
    One child 
  -0.168
***
 
(0.019) 
    Two or more children 
  -0.197
***
 
(0.017) 
Other characteristics
b
 Yes 
Observations 11,588 
Adj. R-squared 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a
 Reference: No children. 
b 
Dummies for employment status, region, and husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and 
household income (logged). 
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Table 2.10. Regression Results by the Number of Existing Children: Including Women Who 
Left the Workforce after Childbirth (Dependent Variable: Conception) 
 
(1) 
No Children 
(2) 
One Child 
(3) 
Two or more children 
After × Treatment 
0.036 
(0.056) 
0.010 
(0.037) 
    0.030
***
 
(0.009) 
Individual’s 
characteristics
a
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,556 2,222 7,810 
Adj. R-squared 0.056 0.054 0.058 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Dummies for after, treatment, employment status, region, number of existing children(in (3)), and 
husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and household income (logged). 
 
Table 2.11 shows that there are positive effects on conception in the treatment group 
post-reform (4.8 percentage points for the year 2011; 2.7 percentage points for the year 2014): 
they are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. And while there is a positive differential 
in the pre-reform period (the year 2005), the magnitude of its coefficient is quite smaller 
compared to other years, and not statistically significant. 
Table 2.11. Heterogeneous Effects over Time: Including Women Who Left the Workforce 
after Childbirth (Dependent Variable: Conception) 
 (1) 
Treatment  × Year 2005
a
 
0.010 
(0.019) 
Treatment  × Year 2011
a
 
0.048
*
 
(0.027) 
Treatment  × Year 2014
a
 
0.027
*
 
(0.015) 
Individual’s characteristicsb Yes 
Observations 11,588 
Adj. R-squared 0.230 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Reference: Treatment × Year 2008. 
b
 Dummies for treatment, year, employment status, region, the number of existing children, and 
husband’s work status, monthly wage (logged) and household income (logged). 
66 
 
 I also estimate the effect of the reform on the use of contraception using education level 
as a proxy for a monthly wage. The results are reported in Table 2.12. Contraceptive use by the 
treatment group decreased by 4.2 percentage points
19
 after the reform compared to the control 
group. When interaction terms for the treatment group with a dummy for each year are included, 
there are negative differentials for the treatment group post-reform (2012 and 2015) though it is 
statistically significant only in the year 2012. By contrast, the policy effect in the pre-reform 
period (2006) is positive, but not statistically significant. These results support the notion that the 
2011 reform led to a decrease in contraception use in the high education group compared to the 
low education group. 
Table 2.12. Regression Results: Using Education as a Proxy for Wage (Dependent Variable: 
Use of Contraception) 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment  × After 
   -0.042
***
 
(0.015) 
 
Treatment  × Year 2006
a
  
0.015 
(0.023) 
Treatment  × Year 2012
a
  
  -0.050
**
 
(0.023) 
Treatment  × Year 2015
a
  
-0.023 
(0.019) 
Individual’s characteristicsb  Yes 
Observations 10,794 10,794 
Adj. R-squared 0.218 0.218 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level, respectively.  
a
 Reference: Treatment × Year 2009 
 
                                                 
19
 The probability of using contraception in the treatment group before the reform was 82.7 percent. 
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2.7  Conclusions 
The 2011 reform in Korean childcare leave policy that enhanced childcare leave benefits for 
relatively high-income earners provides a good case study for investigating the effect of financial 
incentives on the decision to have children. By examining the response to government policy 
changes, this study contributes to the existing literature on fertility policy evaluation. The results 
find that the 2011 reform had positive impacts on rates of conception for regular workers with 
relatively high wages (treatment group) when compared to rates of conception for regular 
workers with lower wages or non-regular workers (control group). The impacts were more 
substantial in second or higher-order fertility cases. The reform had a consistently negative effect 
on the use of contraception by the treatment group. The results also find evidence of declining 
career interruption for the treatment group post-reform compared to the control group. These 
effects seem a direct result of another stated purpose of the reform: lowering the career 
interruption of women after giving birth. 
 Despite the contribution of this study to existing literature on fertility policy evaluation, 
there may be some limitations. First, DID methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual 
policy effects. In Korea, during the period under evaluation, changes were made to other policies 
related to stimulating fertility, including financial assistance to couples with children and 
enhancement of public childcare services. Therefore, the results of this study may be affected 
partially by other policy changes. However, given the fact that the paid childcare leave system is 
a policy solely geared toward encouraging fertility, which is connected only to work status, I 
argue that effects observed are mainly due to the childcare leave benefits reform. Second, other 
types of labor supply effects from the reform need to be studied further, if data are available. For 
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example, the reform might cause women who got are pregnant to enter the labor market or to 
attempt to earn more in order to receive higher childcare benefits when taking leave. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HEALTH SHOCKS AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY: THE CASE OF 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Health problems may result in substantial loss of household income due to involuntary departure 
from the labor force, a decrease in hours worked, as well as direct medical expenditures. In 
response to health problems, spouses may also change the amount of their labor supply. The 
magnitude and direction of spouses’ responses depend mainly on how great the loss of income is, 
how much spouses can offset lost household earnings, or how much health problems impinge on 
the activities of daily living and the subsequent need for care giving for affected spouses.  
This study examines the effect of health shocks on household labor supply using the Korean 
Longitudinal Survey of Aging (KLoSA) which interviews middle-to-old age people. Studying 
the linkage between health shocks and labor supply of household members is important in part 
because of its strong policy implications. The evidence gathered may shed light on a spouse’s 
choices corresponding to an unexpected health problem: to increase labor supply or to provide 
care giving for an ailing partner at home. Also, the results regarding household wealth as a 
measure of income after health problems may be of particular interest to policymakers. A 
significant portion of the population in aging societies reaches the age where health has a great 
impact on labor supply. Therefore, an understanding of the linkage between health and 
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household labor supply in an aging society is essential in the context of associated old-age 
poverty and the design of the social security system.  
Despite its academic importance and policy implications, there are a limited number of 
studies which investigate this relationship. The theories suggest that negative health shocks can 
increase spousal labor supply (Ashenfelter, 1980; Heckman and McCurdy, 1980; Lundberg, 
1985) or decrease it, suggesting in the second case that leisure for couples is often 
complementary (Hurd, 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000; Maestas, 2001). The empirical 
results are mixed. Berger (1983) argues that husbands’ health problems increase the labor supply 
of wives, while McGeary (2009) finds that wives are likely to take early retirement to care for a 
sick spouse. However, Parsons (1977) and Coile (2004) show that the linkage between a 
husband's illness and his wife's labor supply is weak. For the impact on labor supply of poor 
health in wives, Berger (1983) finds a decrease in the labor supply of husbands, while Coile 
(2004) reports a small increase. A few empirical studies also find that the direction of spousal 
labor supply varies depending on various other conditions such as whether the affected spouse 
retires due to the health problems, whether a couple has access to health insurance or retirement 
benefits, etc. (McClenn, 1998; Coile, 2004).  
South Korea (henceforth Korea) is an interesting case to study for several reasons. Korea is 
experiencing a rapid aging of its population without well-developed old-age security. The elderly 
in Korea compared with other developed countries tend to depend on their labor income rather 
than public transfers (OECD, 2013). Moreover, in Korea, the share of out-of-pocket payments in 
total health expenditure was 36.8 percent in 2015, which is a lot higher than the OECD average 
of 21.3 percent, although Korea has a universal public health insurance system, the National 
Health Insurance (OECD, 2017). This high share is because there is a ceiling on reimbursement 
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and some types of medical costs such as drugs, nursing home stays, and other related costs are 
not covered completely. Thus, if middle-to-old age workers experience negative health events 
but are ineligible for a public pension and lack savings, they may have difficulty maintaining a 
decent quality of life in their old age. In these cases, an increase in spousal labor supply may be 
observed in response to health problems, and its magnitude may depend heavily on the level of 
household assets. In addition, whether adult children reside with their parents can affect spousal 
labor supply decisions if adult children can also serve as caregivers for sick parents. 
This study utilizes health shocks as the measurement of health status.
20 
Using health shocks 
has an advantage over self-reported health status in this study, as health shocks are less likely to 
be subject to endogeneity issues. This study employs labor force entry and labor force exit as 
measures for labor supply decisions in order to assess the overall impact of health shocks. In 
addition, this study focuses on how labor supply responses to health shocks depend on the level 
of household assets. Moreover, the availability of adult children to participate in care-giving is 
also considered as factors that affect a sick person's and spousal labor supply. 
This study presents several findings. Health shocks reduce the labor supply of the sick person 
for both males and females, which is consistent with the earlier studies. The study finds that a 
husband’s health shock tends to decrease the probability of an exit from the labor force for the 
wife, depending on the type of shock. However, the significant impact of a woman’s health 
shock on her husband’s labor supply is not found. This negligible impact may reflect the fact that 
women’s earnings are usually a secondary source of household income for dual-earner couples, 
so that male workers may not be very sensitive to the economic impact of their wives' health 
                                                 
20
 To the best of my knowledge, Coile (2004), McGeary (2009) and Ham (2016) are the only studies which utilize 
health shocks to examine the impact of health problems on spousal labor supply. 
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shocks. This study also finds that co-residing adult children tend to decrease the probability of a 
wife’s exit from the labor force in response to a husband’s health shock. Lower net household 
assets decrease the probability of exit from the labor force for males and increase the probability 
of entry into the labor force for females in response to their spouse’s health shocks. This study 
extends the literature on the relationship between health shocks and labor supply in a household 
by investigating factors related to the labor supply response, such as care-giving behavior, 
household wealth, and presence of co-residing adult children.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous 
literature. Section 3.3 discusses the data used and the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 shows 
results and Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
3.2  Literature Reviews 
 3.2.1  Health and Individual Labor Supply 
The starting point of this study is to explore how health status affects an individual’s labor 
supply, which has been examined by extensive previous studies. In the literature of health 
economics, a negative health change means a depreciation in health stock or negative investment 
in health (Becker, 1964; Grossman, 1972). The deterioration of health affects an individual’s 
labor supply through various mechanisms (McClellan, 1998). First, it can have a direct impact on 
an individual’s productivity and results in labor supply changes in either direction, depending on 
the magnitude of the substitution and income effects of the following the reduction in wages. 
Second, negative health events can have an impact on labor supply by either reducing or 
increasing the marginal utility of income. For instance, if the affected individual cannot enjoy 
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relatively high-priced activities such as an overseas trip or eating out due to health problems, 
then the marginal utility of income decreases and it results in a reduction in labor supply. By 
contrast, if the adverse health events substantially increase demand for medications or nursing, 
then the marginal utility of income increases and this causes an increase in labor supply. By 
these measures, the impact of health on labor supply is ambiguous.  
Though the impact of health status on labor supply has been studied extensively from an 
empirical perspective, it is not simple to accurately determine this relationship properly due to 
several methodological problems. First, as many studies point out, in studying the linkage 
between health and labor outcomes, health may not be given exogenously. The current stock of 
health depends on past investments in health, determined by an individual’s lifetime utility 
maximization process, and thus is not determined exogenously (Becker, 1964; Grossman, 1972). 
Also, some studies find that health and socioeconomic status are simultaneously determined, 
mutually affecting each other (Smith and Kington, 1997; Smith 1999). Currie and Madrian 
(1999) suggest that labor market activities affect individuals’ health by directly influencing the 
possibility of workplace injury, stress, and risk-taking behavior. These imply that health itself 
should often be treated as an endogenous variable. Thus, identification strategies in studying the 
consequences for labor supply of health problems need to be employed differently, according to 
health measures used. The second issue is the measurement of health. Empirical results regarding 
the impact of health on labor supply tend to differ depending on the measures used (Currie and 
Madrian, 1999). One common measure used in the literature is self-reported health status or 
health limitations on the ability to work. While this measure is more directly related to 
productivity and shows a significant relationship between health and labor supply in many 
studies, it is subject to measurement error and endogeneity concerns because it depends on an 
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individual’s subjective judgments and may not be independent of labor market outcomes. Other 
measurements such as problems with activities of daily living (ADLs), nutritional status (e.g., 
height or weight) are often utilized, but these variables are not likely to be directly associated 
with the ability to work.  
 3.2.2  Health and Spousal Labor Supply 
A sick worker may not be the only person whose labor supply decision is affected by his/her 
poor health condition. The labor supply of the spouse of that worker can also be affected since 
the labor supply decision in a household is often made jointly between a husband and wife, 
rather than separately (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2016). Theories regarding labor supply decisions in 
middle-to-old aged couples have been discussed primarily in retirement literature. The first 
theoretical channel of spousal response to health shocks is the “Added Worker Effect (AWE).” 
The AWE indicates that negative health shocks which cause a loss of lifetime household income 
increase spousal labor supply, assuming that leisure is a normal good (Ashenfelter, 1980; 
Heckman and McCurdy, 1980; Lundberg, 1985). Moreover, if there is substitution in home 
production between husband and wife, the increased time at home of the spouse who experiences 
health problems may lower the opportunity cost of work in the market for the other partner. This 
can result in enhancing the AWE. Another possible reason for an increase in spousal labor 
supply as a response to health problems is in case that a family is under liquidity constraints 
(Coile, 2004). A household may frequently face liquidity constraints if they don't have adequate 
accumulated savings to maintain consumption levels, or have not reached the age of eligibility 
for a pension. 
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By contrast, there are several reasons why negative health events might not increase 
spousal labor supply. First, leisure for husbands and wives can be complementary rather than 
substitutive as many studies indicate (Hurd, 1990; Maestas, 2001; Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2000; Coile, 2004). This complementarity in married couples leads workers to decrease labor 
supply in response to the health-related retirement of a spouse. Second, if a disabling illness 
raises the need for care-giving for an affected spouse, this effect likely increases the healthy 
spouse’s household production and, thus, decreases the value of his/her labor supply (McGreary, 
2009). It may be more substantial when the spouse is the only caregiver in family. Third, 
alternative financial sources such as employer-provided health insurance or government benefits 
can crowd out the spousal labor supply response (Coile, 2004). As a result, the direction in the 
labor supply of workers response to health shocks endured by a spouse is theoretically 
ambiguous depending on the importance of these factors in household. On the other hand, 
McGeary (2009) suggests some empirical reasons why the effects of spousal health shocks may 
appear insignificant. First, all health shocks do not always have permanent effects. If this is the 
case, the change in the labor supply may not be observed in the data if an individual returns to 
work before the next wave’s interview although the respondent reduces the labor supply 
temporarily. Another reason could be that if health shocks are not severe enough to force a 
worker to exit the labor force, then significant consequence may not be observed. 
There are some empirical studies that estimate the effect of health problems on spousal labor 
supply. Parsons (1977) observes that husband’s illnesses have little impact on the labor supply of 
wife using self-reported health status as a control variable in the National Longitudinal Surveys. 
He interprets that the income effect which increases the labor supply of wife may be offset by the 
need to spend more time in home production to look after the sick spouse. He also uses an 
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activity-limiting health condition as the measurement of health status in the Productive 
Americans Survey which was carried out in 1965. The results demonstrate that men increase 
home production time and women increase market work time in response to spousal illness by 
decreasing their leisure time. Berger (1983) studies how household work is affected when a 
husband or wife suffers a deterioration in health. Health deterioration in this analysis is 
represented by the variables indexing temporary illness, disability, and death in the 1978 Current 
Population Survey (CPS)-March supplement. The author finds that when their spouse’s health is 
poor, a woman tends to increase labor supply, but a man decreases labor supply. McClellan 
(1998) also estimates husbands’ health events on females’ labor supply using the first two waves 
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which was launched in 1992. The author argues that 
women work significantly fewer hours if their spouses experience major negative health events 
and subsequently retire. By contrast, the results find that women tend to increase working hours 
if their husbands have major negative health events but do not retire. However, this study mainly 
focuses on the individual's health events, so the impact of spousal health is not precisely 
reported.  
A study by Coile (2004) uses the first six waves of the HRS to analyze the effect of health 
shocks on the labor supply of both spouses. The results show that spousal health shocks cause 
only a small increase in the labor supply for men and no significant increase for women. 
However, women tend to decrease labor supply when their husband’s health shock is severe. 
This study also employs interactions of health shocks with other characteristics, including access 
to health insurance and retirement benefits such as Social Security or private pensions. In fact, 
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health insurance and labor supply are strongly linked in the U.S.
21
 The author finds that for men, 
the probability of exit from the labor force is greater when their wife has retiree health insurance 
and has a health shock. For women, a husband’s retiree health insurance has little effect. Neither 
effect, however, is significant. In the case of access to pensions, the results show that the 
probability of a husband’s exit from the labor force is greater when a sick wife is pension-
eligible. McGeary (2009) also investigates how retirement decisions are affected by health 
shocks of the other partner in a couple, using eight waves of the HRS (1992-2006). The author 
finds that a wife is more likely to retire to look after a sick spouse, and suggests that these results 
arise since women generally have smaller social security benefits than men. Ham (2016) also 
examines the effect of older adults’ health shocks on their spouse’s labor supply by using the five 
waves of the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging. The results indicate that spouse’s health 
shocks tend to positively affect exit from the labor force for women, while no effect is observed 
for men.  
 
3.3  Data and Empirical Strategy 
This study uses the five waves of the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), 2006-2014 
to explore the effect of health shocks on the labor supply of married couples. The KLoSA began 
in 2006. It interviews individuals who were aged 45 or older in 2006 every two years
22
. It 
includes detailed information on both health and economic behavior such as demographics, 
family, health, employment, income, assets, and so forth. One important aspect of the KLoSA is 
                                                 
21
 Health insurance in the U.S. is provided primarily by the employer. There is a voluminous literature arguing that 
health insurance has a significant effect on labor market outcomes in the U.S. 
22
 The number of samples in 2006 was 10,254. 
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that it contains detailed information on spousal health. The sample in this study includes married 
individuals who are between 45 and 70 years old, were working during the previous wave, 
whose spouse was working during the previous wave, and who were interviewed for at least two 
consecutive waves. The final sample consists of 4,711 individual-wave observations (2,257 
males and 2,454 females). 
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, several studies employ health shocks as a measure, 
rather than self-reported health status, in studying the effect of health on economic behaviors 
(McClellan, 1998; Smith, 1998; Smith, 1999; Riphahn, 1999; Wu, 2003; Coile, 2004; Wagstaff, 
2007; Lee and Kim, 2008; McGeary, 2009; Ham, 2016). Basically, health shocks are defined as 
sudden deteriorations in an individual’s health as a result of disease or accident (Riphahn, 1999). 
Mostly following Coile (2004) and McClellan (1998), this study also utilizes health shocks as a 
key independent variable, categorized into three types: (1) acute health events (heart attack, 
stroke, and cancer); (2) new chronic illnesses (diabetes, lung disease, heart failure, and arthritis); 
(3) accidental injuries or falls. McClellan (1998) suggests that these three types of health shocks 
may result in different consequences due to their heterogeneity in the extent to which health 
shocks lead to severe functional impairments and in the chronicity of health deterioration. For 
example, acute health events tend to have major acute and long-term functional implications; 
new chronic illnesses are less likely to affect functional status but may have long-term 
implications; accidents may result in temporary or permanent acute functional impairments. To 
extract the effects of new health shocks properly, this paper additionally controls for other 
health-related variables; dummies for whether the respondent has already suffered an acute or 
chronic disease; the self-reported index
23
 of limitations on the ability to work, which includes 
                                                 
23
 This index ranges from 1(most severe) to 4 (not at all severe). 
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both the value of the previous wave and change in the value over two waves. The baseline 
regression equation is the linear probability model
24
 as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
own sp
it it it it it itEXIT ownshock spshock X X           ,       (3.1) 
where itEXIT  is a dummy variable for whether an individual i who was working at period t-1 
exits from the labor market at period t; itownshock and itspshock  are dummy variables for 
whether a worker and his/her spouse have experienced a new health shock since t-1; own
itX is a 
set of demographic and economic control variables including age, education, place of residence, 
employment status (t-1), existing conditions for acute and chronic disease, limitations on the 
ability to work (t-1, index), change in limitations on the ability to work over a two-year period 
and net assets in household; sp
itX is a set of spousal characteristics including age, education, 
employment status (t-1), existing condition for acute and chronic disease (t-1, index), limitations 
on the ability to work (t-1), and a change in limitations on the ability to work over a two-year 
period. Dummy variables for each wave are also included. This equation is estimated separately 
for male and female workers.  
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics. Over a two-year period, 7.7 percent of male 
workers exit the labor force while the comparable figure is 15.6 percent for female workers. In 
these two years, 2.7 percent of male workers undergo an acute health event, 2.9 percent are 
diagnosed with a new chronic illness, 1.6 percent are injured in an accident, and thus 6.8 percent 
of men have at least one of these new health shocks. 5.8 percent of male workers have already 
suffered an acute disease, and 17.0 percent have had a chronic illness. The sample statistics for  
                                                 
24
 The probit models as alternative specifications yield qualitatively similar results, and hence are not reported. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics: Labor Force Exit 
 Male Female 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Exited labor force  0.077 0.266 0.156 0.363 
Any new health shocks 0.068 0.252 0.077 0.267 
     Acute health event 0.027 0.160 0.020 0.140 
     Chronic illness 0.029 0.169 0.036 0.187 
     Accident 0.016 0.123 0.026 0.161 
Existing acute condition (1=yes)  0.058 0.231 0.046 0.209 
Existing chronic condition (1=yes) 0.170 0.376 0.212 0.409 
Initial health status (1→4, bad→good) 3.182 0.692 3.078 0.721 
Change in health status  -0.095 0.791 -0.053 0.786 
Age 58.88 5.681 56.53 5.874 
Education (1=high school or more) 0.597 0.491 0.413 0.492 
Employment status (t-1, 1=self-employed) 0.610 0.485 0.577 0.494 
Place of residence (1=rural) 0.314 0.465 0.345 0.476 
Household net assets (median, USD) 
a
 149,990  147,010  
Obs. 2,257 2,454 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a
 It is assumed that 1,000 Korean Won is equal to 1 US dollar. The values are measured in 2008 USD. 
 
the females’ health shocks are relatively similar to those for males’ health shocks. Male workers 
in the sample are, on average, around two years older than female workers. The median value of 
household net assets is about $150,000 (in 2008 USD) for both males and females. 
Table 3.2 describes the characteristics of three health shocks in terms of their 
consequences. In the data set, 35.8 percent of people who suffer an acute health event exit the  
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labor force and 21.0 percent of individuals who are injured in accidents leave the labor market 
while 18.7 percent of people who are diagnosed with a new chronic illness leave the workforce, 
showing the lowest probability of exit from the labor force exit among three types of health 
shocks. Individuals who experience no health shock have a probability of exiting the work force 
of 10.9 percent. It seems clear that an individual's experience of health shocks increases the 
probability of exit from the labor force. Consistently, an acute health event is accompanied by 
the highest probability of a limitation in daily activities (48.6 percent); a chronic illness has the 
lowest impact on loss of function (30.6 percent). Also, an acute health event tends to lead to a 
more significant decrease in annual earned income than any other type of health shock. 
Accordingly, an acute health event results in the most severe impact on labor supply, physical 
function and earned income among the three health shock categories, as expected. By contrast, 
chronic illness has a relatively mild impact. 
Table 3.2. Labor Supply, Limitation in Daily Activities and Income by Health Shocks 
 
Acute health 
event 
Chronic illness Accident No health shock 
Share of individuals who 
exit the labor force (%) 
35.8 18.7 21.0 10.9 
Share of ones with 
limitation in daily 
activities (%) 
48.6 31.0 41.0 NA 
Change in annual earned 
income (USD)
 a
 
-5,318 -3,226 -2,775 -2,497 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a
 It is assumed that 1,000 Korean Won is equal to 1 US dollar. The values are measured in 2008 USD.   
 Unpaid family workers are excluded in the calculation. 
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Figure 3.1 shows the probability of exit from the labor force exit by spousal health shocks 
in the raw data. For male workers, the exit probability is higher when a wife suffers an acute 
health event or an accident than when there is no health shock. However, the impact of a wife’s 
chronic illness on exit from the labor force seems not to be much different from when there is no 
health shock. On the contrary, for female workers, a chronic illness is likely to lead to a 
substantially lower exit probability (7.6 percent) compared to other types of health shocks (acute 
health event: 16.9 percent; accident: 20.0 percent) or no health shock (15.8 percent), implying 
that a husband’s chronic illness causes an AWE for wives. 
Figure 3.1. Probability of Labor Force Exit by Spouse’s Health Shocks 
 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
 
3.4  Results  
 3.4.1  Basic Results 
  Impact of Health Shocks on the Individual 
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The basic results for the linear probability model estimates based on equation (3.1) are presented 
in Table 3.3. The positive effects of health shocks on labor force exit are observed for both males 
and females. The effects are more substantial for male workers. An acute health event for men is 
estimated to lead to a 27.5 percentage point increase in the probability of exit from the labor 
force, and an accident for men raises the probability of exit by 12.8 percentage points. These 
effects are statistically significant and very large relative to the average probabilities of exit of 
7.7 percent. The impact of a chronic illness is, however, relatively small and not significant. 
Accordingly, any health shocks for male workers raise the probability of labor force exit by 13.8 
percentage points. For female workers, an acute health event elicits a 9.7 percentage point 
increase in labor force exit: this effect is marginally significant (p-value: 0.117). Female overall 
health shocks increase the probability of leaving the labor force by 5.6 percentage points and this 
effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results imply that the substitution 
effect of (potentially) reduced wages due to health shocks dominates the income effect.  
  Impact of Spousal Health Shocks 
Table 3.3 also reports the effect of spousal health shocks on the probability of exit from the labor 
force. For male workers, any type of deteriorating spousal health does not statistically 
significantly affect the probability of exit. However, for working women, a husband’s chronic 
illness lowers their probability of labor force exit by 9.2 percentage points as predicted by the 
AWE hypothesis, while neither a husband’s acute health event nor an accident has a significant 
effect. These results raise two questions: (1) Why is the AWE for male workers not observed in 
response to spousal health shocks, and (2) Why is the AWE for female workers substantial in 
response only to chronic illness among the three types of husband’s health shocks? These two  
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Table 3.3. Effects of Health Shocks on Labor Force Exit (0=Working, 1=Exit) 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s any health shocks 
0.015 
(0.025) 
 
-0.030 
(0.026) 
 
      Acute health event 
 0.045 
(0.053) 
 0.006 
(0.044) 
      Chronic illness 
 -0.032 
(0.028) 
 -0.092
***
 
(0.031) 
      Accident 
 0.052 
(0.044) 
 0.030 
(0.061) 
Own any health shocks 
0.138
***
 
(0.032) 
 
0.056
*
 
(0.030) 
 
      Acute health event 
 0.275
***
 
(0.061) 
 0.097
†
 
(0.062) 
      Chronic illness 
 0.038 
(0.039) 
 0.039 
(0.044) 
      Accident 
 0.128
*
 
(0.067) 
 -0.003 
(0.047) 
Existing condition (acute, 1=yes) 
0.042
†
 
(0.026) 
0.043
†
 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
0.001 
(0.038) 
Existing condition (chronic, 1=yes) 
0.034
*
 
(0.018) 
0.029
†
 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
Initial health status (1→4, bad→good) 
-0.065
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.060
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.056
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.057
***
 
(0.015) 
Change in health status 
-0.065
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.058
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.013) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.013) 
Age 
0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
0.005
*
 
(0.003) 
0.004
†
 
(0.003) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
0.046
***
 
(0.016) 
0.042
***
 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
Employment status (1=self-employed) 
-0.062
***
 
(0.014) 
-0.061
***
 
(0.013) 
-0.046
**
 
(0.019) 
-0.047
**
 
(0.019) 
Residence (1=rural) 
-0.031
**
 
(0.013) 
-0.032
**
 
(0.013) 
-0.074
***
 
(0.018) 
-0.074
***
 
(0.018) 
Spouse’s other variables a Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq. 0.106 0.122 0.044 0.046 
Obs. 2,257 2,257 2,454 2,454 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. †, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions include logged household net assets dummies 
for waves. Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals. 
 
a 
Age, education, employment status, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease, initial health 
status, and change in health status. 
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questions can be answered by examining the magnitude of income loss and the care-giving needs 
caused by spousal health shocks.  
The AWE for males can be offset if a wife’s health shocks trigger substantial care-giving 
needs. However, as can be seen in Table 3.4, only 1.6% of female workers who have new health 
shocks receive care-giving from a husband although these health shocks are limiting to their 
daily activities
25
. Another explanation for this little impact on male workers could be that the 
earnings of women are usually smaller than those of men and often a secondary income source in 
dual-earner couples in Korea. Therefore, male workers may not be sensitive to the economic 
impact of female’s health shocks, resulting in little male workers’ AWE. Table 3.4 provides the 
supportive statistics. In the samples, the average annual earned income at the previous period (t-
1) was $22,932 (in 2008 USD) for male workers, which is more than double of female workers’ 
annual earnings (USD 9,824).  
Table 3.4. Annual Earned Income by Gender and Share of Individuals Receiving Care-giving 
from the Spouse by Gender and Heath Shocks 
 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
Average annual earned income (t-1, USD)
a
 22,932 9,824 
Share of individuals receiving care from the spouse (%) 18.1 1.6 
    Acute health event (%)
b
 30.6 0 
    Chronic illness (%)
b
  4.4 0 
    Accident (%)
b
 13.3 4.0 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a
 It is assumed that 1,000 Korean Won is equal to 1 US dollar. The values are measured in 2008 USD.  
b
 These health shocks are limiting daily activities of individual.    
                                                 
25
 In Korea, the smaller amount of care-giving by males for their wives may arise because it is difficult for male 
workers to stop work due to it often being the primary source of income ; or perhaps because men are not as good as 
women at care-giving. 
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The AWE for female workers can be more significant in cases of husbands’ chronic 
illness if a chronic illness requires less need for a wife’s care, or results in longer-term medical 
expenditures. Table 3.4 shows that only 4.4 percent of husbands who are diagnosed with a 
chronic illness receive care-giving from their wife while an acute health event and an accident 
cause 30.6 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively.
26
 The relatively smaller need to care for 
husbands with chronic illness can lead to strengthening the AWE for women. 
 3.4.2  Severity of Health Shocks 
Workers’ labor supply response to health shocks may vary depending on the severity of the 
shocks because more severe health shocks can lead to higher income loss or require more 
assistance with daily activities. However, health shock measures in the KLoSA do not allow 
differentiating between moderate and severe health deterioration directly. Thus, to test the role of 
severity, this study utilizes the KLoSA’s question about whether a health shock limits a 
respondent’s daily activities as a proxy for severity. The health shock is regarded as “Severe” if 
it limits daily activities. Table 3.5 reports the regression results of equation (3.1) where the health 
shock variables are classified into two different categories based on their severity. This method 
compares each worker’s group, (“severe” and “not severe”) with the reference group of 
individuals without related health shock. As might be expected, overall severe health shocks are 
associated with an increase of 24.6 percentage points for male workers and 13.0 percentage 
points for female workers in the probability of labor force exit compared to individuals without 
health shocks. These effects are strongest in terms of magnitude and significance in cases of an 
acute health shock. The impacts of “not severe” health shocks are marginally significant at the 15  
                                                 
26
 In spite of its importance in explaining the empirical results, medical expenditures which are related to health 
shocks cannot be identified in this study due to data limitation. 
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Table 3.5. Effects of Health Shocks on Labor Force Exit by Severity (0=Working, 1=Exit,) 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s health shocks     
  Any & Not severe 
0.030 
(0.029) 
 
-0.060
*
 
(0.032) 
 
  Any & Severe 
-0.017 
(0.039) 
 
-0.001 
(0.041) 
 
    Acute & Not severe  
0.019 
(0.064) 
 
-0.029 
(0.068) 
    Acute & Severe  
0.081 
(0.097) 
 
0.027 
(0.057) 
    Chronic & Not severe  
-0.011 
(0.034) 
 
-0.062
†
 
(0.041) 
    Chronic & Severe  
-0.085
***
 
(0.021) 
 
-0.154
***
 
(0.043) 
    Accident & Not severe  
0.094
†
 
(0.059) 
 
-0.040 
(0.069) 
    Accident & Severe  
-0.013 
(0.053) 
 
0.114 
(0.096) 
 Own health shocks     
  Any & Not severe 
0.054
†
 
(0.037) 
 
0.019 
(0.035) 
 
  Any & Severe 
0.246
***
 
(0.053) 
 
0.130
**
 
(0.057) 
 
    Acute & Not severe  
0.178
**
 
(0.086) 
 
0.025 
(0.066) 
    Acute & Severe  
0.334
***
 
(0.080) 
 
0.265
**
 
(0.122) 
    Chronic & Not severe  
0.006 
(0.042) 
 
0.034 
(0.051) 
    Chronic & Severe  
0.098 
(0.075) 
 
0.071 
(0.085) 
    Accident & Not severe  
0.057 
(0.076) 
 
-0.062 
(0.054) 
    Accident & Severe  
0.228
**
 
(0.113) 
 
0.092 
(0.082) 
Adj. R-sq. 0.115 0.128 0.046 0.050 
Obs. 2,257 2,257 2,454 2,454 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
†
, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions include dummies for education, employment 
status, residence, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease and waves, age, logged household 
net assets, and spouse’s other variables. Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on 
same individuals. 
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percent level for males and are not significant for females.  
As shown in Column (3) of Table 3.5, female workers’ probability of exit from the labor 
force decreases by 6.0 percentage points in response to husbands’ health shocks overall which 
are “not severe”. These AWEs are observed in all three types of men’s “not severe” health 
shocks although they are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. One of the possible 
explanations for these results can be found in a difference in care-giving needs by the severity of 
health shocks. In the samples, 18.1 percent of the husbands with severe heath shocks received 
care-giving from their wives, while 3.7 percent of the husbands with “not severe” health 
themselves so much about caring for an ailing husband. Interestingly, a spouse’s severe chronic 
illness significantly leads to an AWE for both males and females. These results might result from 
the fact that a chronic illness requires less spousal care even if it is severe, compared to other 
types of health shocks. Another possible reason for these results is that a severe chronic illness 
results in greater medical costs due to its long-term effects, and this therefore enhances the 
AWE. As described by Heckman and McCurdy (1980), the AWE tends to be more substantial if 
the income loss is larger. 
3.4.3  Presence of Adult Children in Household   
Another important factor in labor supply response to health shocks may be living arrangements. 
In particular, the presence of adult children in a household may have a critical impact on labor 
supply decisions since adult children can be an alternative caregiver for the sick worker. 
Therefore, this study investigates the effect of adult children on labor supply response to health 
shocks by having the dummy variables for health shocks interact with a dummy for whether 
respondents live with their adult children. 
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Table 3.6. Effects of Co-residence with Adult Children on Labor Force Exit 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s any health shocks  
 × Co-residence with adult children 
0.040 
(0.048) 
 
-0.086
*
 
(0.049) 
 
   Sp_Acute  
   × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.051 
(0.106) 
 -0.095 
(0.084) 
   Sp_Chronic  
   × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.016 
(0.057) 
 0.007 
(0.058) 
   Sp_Accident  
   × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.065 
(0.086) 
  -0.205
**
 
(0.101) 
Spouse’s any health shocks  
-0.002 
(0.033) 
 
0.007 
(0.038) 
 
   Sp_Acute health event 
 0.023 
(0.071) 
 0.053 
(0.067) 
   Sp_Chronic illness 
 -0.040 
(0.037) 
  -0.092
**
 
(0.042) 
   Sp_Accident 
 0.016 
(0.059) 
 0.092 
(0.084) 
Own any health shocks 
× Co-residence with adult children 
0.070 
(0.065) 
 
0.032 
(0.060) 
 
   Acute × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.053 
(0.120) 
  -0.213
*
 
(0.117) 
   Chronic × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.015 
(0.076) 
 0.104 
(0.088) 
   Accident × Co-residence with adult children 
 0.000 
(0.132) 
 0.103 
(0.093) 
Own any health shocks 
0.106
**
 
(0.043) 
 
0.041 
(0.041) 
 
   Acute health event 
   0.242
*** 
(0.093) 
 0.176
*
 
(0.086) 
   Chronic illness 
 0.032 
(0.052) 
 -0.009 
(0.055) 
   Accident 
 0.133 
(0.095) 
 -0.052 
(0.060) 
Co-residence with adult children (1=yes) 
-0.105 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
Adj. R-sq. 0.107 0.123 0.045 0.051 
Obs. 2,257 2,257 2,454 2,454 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
†
, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions include dummies for education, employment 
status, residence, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease and waves, age, logged household 
net assets, and spouse’s other variables. Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on 
same individuals. 
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As can be seen in Table 3.6, the results find that co-residence with adult children lowers 
the probability of exit from the labor force exit for women by 8.6 percentage points in response 
to a husband’s new health shocks. The sign of coefficients for interaction terms for an acute 
health event and an accident are negative for women. Given that women more often provide 
care-giving to a spouse who has had new health shocks than men do, especially in cases of an 
acute health event or an accident (as shown in Table 3.4), these negative signs of coefficients are 
consistent with expectations. These results imply that adult children may substitute for a mother 
in care-giving for a father. Specifically, in response to a husband’s accident, female workers who 
live with adult children tend to have a probability of exit lower by 20.5 percentage points than 
female workers without adult children in the household. 
3.4.4  Household Net Assets  
An individual who has a sick spouse may rely more on savings or borrowing instead of adjusting 
labor supply, if a family has sufficient wealth or is able to access capital markets easily (i.e., no 
liquidity constraint). Coile (2004) argues that if a household is facing liquidity constraints, this 
enhances the likelihood of an increase in labor supply as a response to spousal health problems.
27
 
This point may be particularly noticeable in Korea since many older Koreans were not able to 
accumulate great wealth due mainly to the high cost of raising children, and limitations on 
eligibility for public pensions. This study examines whether the level of household net assets 
affects the labor supply response to spousal health shocks. One way to explore this is to provide 
a continuous variable for the level of household net assets to interact with the health shocks. 
However, this method of analysis may be problematic because health shocks can affect the level 
                                                 
27
 In fact, the level of household assets and the degree of liquidity are closely related. Some studies (Juster and 
Shay, 1964; Zeldes, 1989; Runkle, 1991) argue that low-wealth households are more likely to be liquidity-
constrained, while high-wealth households have easier access to credit markets or no need to borrow. 
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of household net assets as well as labor supply simultaneously. In order to mitigate this problem, 
I use the dummy variable for the level of household net assets (“B_25”) instead of the continuous 
variable. Note that the dummy variable “B_25” is one, if individuals are in the bottom 25 percent 
of household net assets distribution, and zero otherwise.  
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.7. For males, the AWE is observed as indicating 
that workers in the bottom 25 percent have an exit probability of 13.7 percentage points lower in 
response to a wife’s health shocks than workers in the top 75 percent. These effects are more 
substantial in the case of accident. However, comparable effects are not observed for female 
workers. 
 3.4.5  Impacts on Labor Force Entry 
The previous subsections focus on the labor supply decisions of workers who were participating 
in the labor market during the previous wave. However, to assess the overall impact of health 
shocks on labor supply, the impact on labor force entry for non-workers also needs to be 
examined. To do it, this subsection analyses people who are 70 years old or younger, and who 
were not participating in the labor market during the previous wave. A total 6,593 individual-
wave observations are collected (1,687 males and 4,906 females). The regression equation is as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
own sp
it it it it it itENTRY ownshock spshock X X           ,     (3.2) 
where itENTRY  is a dummy variable for whether individual i who was not in the labor force at 
period t-1 enters the labor market at period t; itownshock  and itspshock  are defined as the 
same as those in equation (3.1); own
itX is a set of an individual’s characteristics including age, 
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Table 3.7. Effects of Health Shocks on Labor Force Exit by the Level of Household Net Assets 
(0=Working, 1=Exit) 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s any health shocks × B_25 
 -0.137
*** 
(0.038) 
 
-0.046 
(0.063) 
 
    Sp_Acute × B_25  
-0.130
†
 
(0.079) 
 
-0.064 
(0.103) 
    Sp_Chronic × B_25  
-0.054 
(0.047) 
 
0.030 
(0.074) 
    Sp_Accident × B_25  
 -0.206
***
 
(0.070) 
 
0.066 
(0.128) 
Spouse’s any health shocks  
0.059
*
 
(0.034) 
 
-0.042 
(0.029) 
 
    Sp_Acute health event  
0.075 
(0.070) 
 
0.018 
(0.050) 
    Sp_Chronic illness  
-0.016 
(0.041) 
 
  -0.105
***
 
(0.032) 
    Sp_Accident  
0.123
*
 
(0.064) 
 
0.010 
(0.073) 
Own any health shocks × B_25 
0.033 
(0.072) 
 
-0.021 
(0.065) 
 
    Acute × B_25  
-0.156 
(0.139) 
 
0.177 
(0.144) 
    Chronic × B_25  
0.117 
(0.096) 
 
-0.049 
(0.095) 
    Accident × B_25  
0.165 
(0.131) 
 
-0.082 
(0.093) 
Own any health shocks 
  0.130
***
 
(0.038) 
 
0.061 
(0.037) 
 
    Acute health event  
  0.303
*** 
(0.069) 
 
0.048 
(0.070) 
    Chronic illness  
0.003 
(0.039) 
 
0.050 
(0.053) 
    Accident  
0.076 
(0.084) 
 
0.028 
(0.063) 
B_25  
(1=Bottom 25% of household net 
assets) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.022) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
Adj. R-sq. 0.110 0.130 0.044 0.047 
Obs. 2,257 2,257 2,454 2,454 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
†
, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions include dummies for education, employment 
status, residence, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease and waves, age, logged household 
net assets, and spouse’s other variables. Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on 
same individuals. 
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education, place of residence, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease, limitations on 
the ability to work (t-1, index), change in limitations on the ability to work over a two-year 
period and net assets in household; sp
itX is a set of spousal characteristics including age, 
education, working status (t-1 and t), existing condition for acute and chronic disease (t-1), 
limitations on the ability to work (t-1), and a change in limitations on the ability to work over a 
two-year period. Dummy variables for each wave are also included  
Table 3.8 reports the summary statistics of the samples. 17.2 percent of men who were 
economically inactive during the previous wave enter the labor market, and 12.0 percent of 
women start working. Around 10 percent of people experience new health shocks during a given 
period for both men and women, and their existing conditions for acute and chronic diseases are 
worse than those of workers who are analyzed in the previous subsections. Worse already-
existing conditions are likely to be among the reasons why they left the labor market during the 
previous wave.  
Table 3.9 shows the share of individuals receiving care-giving from a spouse when they 
suffered health shocks which limited daily activities. The statistics show that 30.6 percent of 
males and 14.1 of females receive care-giving from their spouse. Unlike the earlier analysis 
where samples are the workers who participated in the labor market during the previous wave, a 
small proportion of women receive care-giving from their husband. This difference between two 
analyses in the share of females receiving care likely arises from the fact that 45.1 percent of 
husbands in the female samples were not working during the previous period and, thus, husbands 
may be relatively free to care for their sick wives. 
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Table 3.8. Summary Statistics: Labor Force Entry 
 Male Female 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D 
Entered labor force  0.172 0.377 0.120 0.326 
Any new health shock 0.107 0.309 0.105 0.306 
     Acute health event 0.044 0.199 0.028 0.165 
     Chronic illness 0.041 0.202 0.057 0.232 
     Accident 0.027 0.161 0.027 0.163 
Existing condition (acute, 1=yes)   0.202 0.401 0.116 0.320 
Existing condition (chronic, 1=yes) 0.298 0.457 0.299 0.458 
Initial health status (1→4, bad→good) 2.657 0.893 2.830 0.783 
Change in health status  -0.002 0.819 -0.020 0.780 
Age 64.43 4.610 60.07 6.335 
Education (1=high school or more) 0.276 0.447 0.381 0.486 
Spouse’s working status (t, 1=working) 0.265 0.442 0.451 0.497 
Spouse’s working status (t-1, 1=working) 0.323 0.468 0.547 0.498 
Place of residence (1=rural) 0.209 0.407 0.182 0.385 
Household net assets (median, USD) 
a
 151,181  162,000  
Obs. 1,687 4,906 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a It is assumed that 1,000 Korean Won is equal to 1 US dollar. The values are measured in 2008 USD. 
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Table 3.9. Share of Individuals Receiving Care-giving from the Spouse by Gender and Health 
Shocks 
 Male Female 
Any health shocks (%)
b
 30.6 14.1 
    Acute health event (%)
b
 28.3 10.0 
    Chronic illness (%)
b 
34.3 15.6 
    Accident (%)
b
 30.0 13.9 
Note: Calculated by the author using the KLoSA data. 
a
 It is assumed that 1,000 Korean Won is equal to 1 US dollar. The values are measured in 2008 USD. 
b
 These health shocks are limiting daily activities of individual.   
 
Table 3.10 provides the regression results for equation (3.2). For males, no statistically 
significant effect of their own or their spouse’s health shocks is observed. For females, however, 
an individual's acute health event causes a 6.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
labor force entry. Also, for women, the AWE follows spouse’s health shocks. The husbands’ 
overall health shocks increase the probability of entry into the work force by 2.6 percentage 
points, though this is marginally significant at the 15 percent level (p-value: 0.120). These results 
are consistent with the results of the previous analysis where the dependent variable is labor 
force exit. I also run regressions where the interaction terms with a dummy for the level of 
household assets (“B_25”) and health shocks are included. As reported in Table 3.11, the results 
indicate that for males, no significant impact is observed. However, in response to a husband’s 
health shocks, the probability of labor force entry of females who are in the bottom 25 percent of 
net asset holders is 11.8 percentage points higher than that of females in the top 75 percent. This 
suggests that lower household net assets strengthen the AWE of women. This AWE is more 
substantial in cases of a husband’s acute health event. 
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Table 3.10. Effects of Health Shocks on Labor Force Entry (0=No Entry, 1=Entry) 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s any health shocks 
0.009 
(0.028) 
 
0.026
†
 
(0.017) 
 
      Acute health event  
0.009 
(0.051) 
 
0.014 
(0.023) 
      Chronic illness  
0.019 
(0.038) 
 
0.025 
(0.024) 
      Accident  
-0.022 
(0.049) 
 
0.052 
(0.038) 
Own any health shocks 
-0.000 
(0.027) 
 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
 
      Acute health event  
-0.055 
(0.035) 
 
  -0.066
***
 
(0.017) 
      Chronic illness  
0.032 
(0.044) 
 
0.006 
(0.018) 
      Accident  
0.004 
(0.047) 
 
0.026 
(0.028) 
Existing acute condition (1=yes) 
-0.037
*
 
(0.022) 
-0.039
*
 
(0.022) 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
Existing chronic condition (1=yes) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
Initial health status (1→4, bad→good) 
  0.080
***
 
(0.013) 
  0.079
***
 
(0.013) 
0.048
***
 
(0.009) 
0.048
***
 
(0.009) 
Change in health status 
  0.061
***
 
(0.013) 
  0.060
***
 
(0.013) 
0.035
***
 
(0.007) 
0.034
***
 
(0.007) 
Age 
 -0.019
***
 
(0.004) 
  -0.019
***
 
(0.004) 
 -0.005
***
 
(0.002) 
 -0.005
***
 
(0.002) 
Education (1=high school or more) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
 -0.030
**
 
(0.013) 
 -0.029
**
 
(0.014) 
Place of residence (1=rural) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
  0.111
***
 
(0.015) 
  0.111
***
 
(0.015) 
Spouse’s other variables a Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq. 0.098 0.099 0.073 0.074 
Obs. 1,687 1,687 4,906 4,906 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. †, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All regressions include a dummy for waves. Standard errors are 
corrected for repeated observations on same individuals. 
a
 Age, education, working status (t-1, t), existing conditions for acute and chronic disease, 
initial health status, and change in health status. 
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Table 3.11. Effects of Health Shocks on Labor Force Entry by the Level of Household Net 
Assets (0=No Entry, 1=Entry) 
 Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse’s any health shocks × B_25 
0.008
 
(0.059) 
 
 0.118
***
 
(0.042) 
 
    Sp_Acute × B_25  
0.069 
(0.113) 
 
 0.194
***
 
 (0.061) 
    Sp_Chronic × B_25  
-0.020 
(0.077) 
 
0.072 
(0.063) 
    Sp_Accident × B_25  
0.013 
(0.099) 
 
0.068 
(0.078) 
Spouse’s any health shocks  
0.007 
(0.034) 
 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
 
    Sp_Acute health event  
-0.012 
(0.059) 
 
 -0.042
**
 
(0.020) 
    Sp_Chronic illness  
0.026 
(0.045) 
 
0.006 
(0.026) 
    Sp_Accident  
-0.027 
(0.062) 
 
0.024 
(0.042) 
Own any health shocks × B_25 
-0.004 
(0.055) 
 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
 
    Acute × B_25  
-0.007 
(0.077) 
 
-0.055
†
 
(0.034) 
    Chronic × B_25  
-0.072 
(0.086) 
 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
    Accident × B_25  
0.084 
(0.093) 
 
0.005 
(0.060) 
Own any health shocks 
-0.001 
(0.032) 
 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
 
    Acute health event  
-0.055
 
(0.041) 
 
 -0.050
**
 
(0.021) 
    Chronic illness  
0.046 
(0.052) 
 
0.018 
(0.022) 
    Accident  
-0.026 
(0.060) 
 
0.022 
(0.031) 
B_25 (1=Bottom 25% of household net assets) 
-0.035 
(0.027) 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
Adj. R-sq. 0.099 0.101 0.076 0.078 
Obs. 1,687 1,687 4,906 4,906 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. †, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15, 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. These specifications have fewer observations than the previous 
ones due to missing household net asset data. All regressions include dummies for education, 
residence, existing conditions for acute and chronic disease and waves, age, logged household net 
assets, and spouse’s other variables. Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same 
individuals. 
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3.5  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of an individual's own and spousal health shocks on the labor 
supply in Korea. The study finds that health shocks lower the labor supply of both males and 
females, which is consistent with previous studies. The study reveals that husbands’ chronic 
illnesses tend to increase wives’ labor supply, as predicted by the AWE. One of the possible 
reasons why the AWE is observed in cases of husbands’ chronic illnesses is that among three 
types of husbands’ health shocks, chronic illness is less often followed by wives’ care-giving, 
which may offset the AWE. The results also find that wives’ health shocks have little impact on 
husbands’ labor supply. This may result from the fact that women’s earnings are usually less 
than men’s earnings in dual-earner couples, so that male workers may not be sensitive to 
female’s health shocks in terms of subsequent household income loss. 
In addition, this study addresses the role of the presence of co-residing adult children and 
the level of household net assets in determining the impact of health shocks on labor supply of 
married couples. With respect to the role of the presence of adult children in the household, the 
results indicate that co-residence with adult children tends to decrease the probability of exit 
from the labor force exit for women if husbands experience health shocks. In these cases, co-
residing adult children may substitute for a mother in care-giving for a father. The most 
important findings of the study are that lower net assets in a household reduce the probability of 
exit from the labor force exit for males and raise the probability of entry into the labor force for 
females in response to their spousal health shocks. These results suggest that lack of sufficient 
savings or liquidity constraints enhance the AWE in Korea. 
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Given the current concerns about poverty among the elderly and a rapidly aging 
population in Korea, these findings produce two important implications. First, the Korean elderly 
tend to depend more on labor income than public transfers, compared with other developed 
countries. Therefore, if the elderly face negative health shocks with little chance of eligibility for 
a public pension or a lack of savings, they may have difficulty maintaining a decent quality of 
life in old age. Second, in response to spousal health shocks, an involuntary increase in labor 
supply of a spouse in lower-income groups may make a situation worse if working conditions are 
poor and thus increases likelihood of further health problems. 
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